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I. Alaska
A. Legislative Developments
The Alaska State Legislature enacted H.B. 111,1 which builds on the
passage of H.B. 247 in 2016. Among other things, this new legislation
phases out cashable exploration tax credits to oil and gas companies
operating in Alaska. It also retroactively ends cash payments from the State
of Alaska to oil companies starting July 1, 2017, changes the interest rate
on production taxes, allows oil companies to carry forward losses for either
10 or 7 years, and limits the time companies can hold deductions at full
value. The legislation took effect on January 1, 2018.
B. Judicial Developments
In In re Aurora Gas, LLC, a buyer sought approval from the Alaska Oil
and Gas Conservation Committee (AOGCC) to purchase several of a
bankruptcy debtor’s oil and gas well leases. The AOGCC conditioned
approval of the transfer on the buyer assuming the debtor’s obligations to
plug and abandon certain gas wells which were not being purchased. The
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Alaska held that, by
conditioning the approval of the lease sale upon the buyer’s assumption of
the debtor’s obligations to plug and abandon wells, the AOGCC violated
both the bankruptcy code’s automatic stay and its prohibition against
discriminatory treatment of bankruptcy debtors. The court struck down the
AOGCC decision.2
C. Administrative Developments
In April of 2017, President Trump signed an Executive Order3 aimed at
expanding offshore drilling in the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans and assessing
whether energy exploration can take place in marine sanctuaries in the
Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. These lands were made eligible for oil and gas
leasing only four months after the prior administration issued both a
Presidential Memorandum4 withdrawing 125 million acres of the Arctic
Ocean (and its estimated 27 billion barrels of oil) from disposition by
1. 2017 Alaska Adv. Legis. Serv. 3, 2017 Alaska HB 111.
2. 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3278 (D. Alaska Sept. 26, 2017).
3. Exec. Order No. 13,795, 82 FR 20815 (Apr. 28, 2017).
4. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Secretary of the Interior (Dec.
20, 2016) (available through the Obama White House Archives) https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/20/presidential-memorandum-withdrawal-certainportions-united-states-arctic.
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leasing for an indefinite period and an Executive Order5 creating the
Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area and withdrawing 112,300
square miles in Norton Sound, Alaska and near St. Lawrence Island, Alaska
from future oil and gas leasing.
In May of 2017, the Secretary of the Interior signed a secretarial order
requiring, among other things, a review of the Obama Administration’s plan
for managing the National Petroleum Reserve – Alaska (NPR-A). The order
is intended to revitalize energy production in the NPR-A and to update
resource assessments for portions of Alaska’s North Slope, including part
of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR).
In December of 2017, President Trump signed into law the national Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. The bill opens a portion of ANWR to oil
drilling and other energy development which had been closed to exploration
for over 40 years, and requires the federal government to hold two lease
sales within seven years.
II. Arkansas
A. Legislative Developments
Act No. 514 of 20176 changed a portion of Arkansas’ procedure for
collection of delinquent ad valorem taxes on mineral interests. Under prior
law, each county collector was required to publish a list of delinquencies in
a legal newspaper as a prerequisite of the forfeiture process. Act No. 514
removed that requirement with respect to tax-delinquent severed mineral
interests, substituting the posting of notice of delinquencies as to those
interests on a web site to be created and maintained by the Association of
Arkansas Counties. The collector is now merely required to publish a legal
notice referring mineral taxpayers to that website. It appears likely that this
procedural change will be challenged as providing insufficient due process
prior to forfeiture of a property right.7

5. Executive Order, Northern Bearing Sea Climate Resilience (Dec. 9, 2016) (available
at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/09/executive-ordernorthern-bering-sea-climate-resilience).
6. Amending ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-23-204.
7. See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 126 S. Ct. 1708, 164 L.Ed.2d 415.
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B. Judicial Developments
In JS Interests, Inc. v. Hafner8 the court twice interpreted the parties’
1982 A.A.P.L. Form 610 Operating Agreement to require a unit’s operator
to pay overriding royalties to parties burdening a non-operating owner who
was non-consent in the wells in question. Such interests appear to be
“subsequently created interests” under the agreement’s Article III.D and
would thus be required to be borne by the party whom the interests
burdened, regardless of its non-consent status. However, the court held that
since the assignments creating the overriding royalties had been recorded
prior to execution of the operating agreement, they were thus disclosed in
writing to all parties, causing them to then burden the consenting parties
who had acquired the non-consenting interest. The court first so held in an
order denying the operator’s motion to dismiss and again denying its
summary judgment motion. The second of those opinions was subsequently
withdrawn by the court pursuant to a settlement agreement which
terminated the litigation.9 The court’s conclusion is highly questionable
and, if correct, effectively guts the agreement’s Article III.D, since virtually
all assignments of overriding royalty interests are recorded, long before
execution of the operating agreement.
Lipsey v. SEECO, Inc.10 was a putative federal class action seeking to
certify a class of royalty owners who allegedly suffered damages due to
belated post-period price adjustments correcting BTU mismeasurements at
the wellhead. Plaintiffs offered a wide array of theories why they should be
permitted to pursue such claims. However, in a detailed opinion, the district
court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all such claims and
denied plaintiffs leave to amend holding that no amended complaint could
survive a similar summary judgment motion.
In Ouachita Watch League v. United States Forest Service11 the federal
appeals court dismissed an appeal prosecuted by the plaintiff society and
several individuals challenging the Forest Service’s resource management
plan which permitted oil and gas drilling within portions of the Ozark
National Forest. The district court had entered summary judgment for the
Forest Service. However, rather than dealing with the district court’s ruling,

8. 2017 WL 5653873 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 10, 2017); 2017 WL 3612857 (E.D. Ark. Aug.
22, 2017).
9. 2017 WL 6459566 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 27, 2017).
10. 2017 WL 2662977 (E.D. Ark. June 20, 2017).
11. 858 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 2017)
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the appeals court dismissed the appeal, holding that the society lacked
standing to challenge the Forest Service’s management plan.
In Hill v. Southwestern Energy Company12 the federal appeals court
reversed a district court’s ruling granting summary judgment to
Southwestern. Plaintiffs had sued, alleging underground trespass, claiming
that Southwestern’s hydraulic fracturing of wells caused waste material to
encroach beneath their unleased tracts. A skeptical Court of Appeals held
that there was possible evidence upon which a jury could find that trespass
occurred, thus precluding summary judgment.
Talley v. Peedin13 involved a complex dispute between the children of
the former wife of a mineral owner and the mineral owner’s widow. While
married to the appellants’ mother, Veta Poff Moon, Dr. Nathan Poff, Sr.
acquired, in his name alone, the surface and fractional mineral interest
within approximately 300 acres in the heart of the Fayetteville Shale area.
Dr. Poff later conveyed that land by warranty deed which Veta joined,
purporting to reserve to the Grantors one-half of all oil, gas and minerals
rights which they own. Appellants contended that the above reservation
language vested Veta with a fee interest in the reserved minerals. In
affirming the trial court’s ruling favoring Dr. Poff’s widow, Carolyn
Peedin, the appeals court avoided holding whether the purported reservation
in favor of Veta was a void stranger reservation, and whether Arkansas
recognizes the spousal exception to the rule that a reservation in favor of a
stranger is void.14 The court instead held that the above language only
reserved minerals “owned” by the grantors and that Veta owned only an
inchoate dower interest at the time of the reservation.
Duvall v. Carr-Pool15 came about through a complex set of facts. Here is
the sequence of deeds at issue: (1) Hawkins and wife deeded to Cargile,
reserving all oil, gas and other minerals. (2) Cargile deeded the surface back
to Hawkins. That deed stated that all oil, gas and other minerals were
reserved by Cargile, but Cargile never owned any minerals in the first
place, since they were reserved by Hawkins and wife in deed 1. (3)
Hawkins deeded to Duvall, predecessor to the Plaintiff, Carr-Pool. That
deed stated that it was understood that all oil, gas, and minerals in or under
or that may be produced from said land have been previously reserved or
conveyed. (4) After numerous conveyances within the Hawkins family, any
12. 858 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 2017)
13. 2017 Ark. App. 80, 515 S.W.3d 611.
14. An issue discussed but left undecided by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Haynes v.
Metcalf, 759 S.W.2d 542 (Ark. 1988).
15. 2016 Ark. App. 466, 509 S.W.3d 661.
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interest which was effectively reserved by Hawkins passed to Carr-Pool.
The court of appeals held that Carr-Pool owned a disputed mineral interest
because the above quoted language was an effective mineral reservation.
The court found that there are no magic words needed for a mineral
reservation to become effective. Its result was reached by simply construing
the “four corners” of the instrument. However, this writer suggests that
perhaps a better reason for the same result could have been that the
language was ambiguous, thus permitting inquiry into the parties’
subjective intent. Facts recited by the appeals court indicated both sides had
previously behaved consistent with the court’s interpretation.
III. California
A. Legislative Developments
The California Legislature made a number of amendments in 2017 to the
California Public Resources Code regarding the regulation of oil and gas
operations by the Division of Gas and Geothermal Resources of the
California Department of Conservation (DOGGR). Senate Bill No. 72416
extended the period to commence well operations after DOGGR approval
from one to two years.17 The bill also amended the idle well requirements
under Public Resources Code section 3206. Public Resources section 3237,
which had previously had only specifically authorized DOGGR to order the
plugging and abandonment “deserted wells,” was amended to authorize
DOGGR to also order the decommissioning of a “production facility.” 18
Public Resources section 3237 was further amended to allow an
abandonment or decommissioning order to issue whether or not any
damage is occurring or threatened by reason of that deserted well or
production facility. The bill also increased funding for DOGGR to abandon
“idle-deserted” and “hazardous wells”19 and directed DOGGR to provide a
report on such wells to the Legislature.

16. Senate Bill No. 724; Stats. 2017, Chapter 652. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/
faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB724
17. CALIFORNIA PUB. RESOURCES CODE, § 3203(a).
18. “Production facility” is defined in CALIFORNIA PUB. RESOURCES CODE, § 3010 as
“any equipment attendant to oil and gas production or injection operations including, but not
limited to, tanks, flowlines, headers, gathering lines, wellheads, heater treaters, pumps,
valves, compressors, injection equipment, and pipelines that are not under the jurisdiction of
the State Fire Marshal pursuant to Section 51010 of the Government Code.”
19. CALIFORNIA PUB. RESOURCES CODE, § 3258.
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Public Resources Code section 3100 was amended by Senate Bill No.
80920 to give the Director of the Department of Conservation and
DOGGR’s Supervisor the authority to redefine DOGGR's districts as
needed to ensure efficient administration after soliciting public input. The
bill also amended Public Resources Code section 3008 to clarify that an
“idle well” does not include an “active observation well”.
The California State Water Resources Control Board and the Regional
Water Quality Control Boards were authorized by new Water Code section
13267.5 to require an operator or its supplier to furnish information relating
to all chemicals in discharged wastewater when one of the board conducts a
water quality investigation regarding the discharge of wastewater produced
from an oil or gas field.21
Section 38592.5 was added to the Health and Safety Code22, to require
the California Air Resources Board in its implementation of the California
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 to update its scoping plan to
achieve the greenhouse gas emissions reductions to designate a marketbased compliance mechanism as the rule for petroleum refineries and oil
and gas production facilities.
B. Judicial Developments
In Southern California Gas Co. v. Superior Court,23 the court held that
the operator of a natural gas storage facility did not owe a duty to prevent
economic losses to local businesses based on alleged negligent conduct
related to the leak of natural gas the facility. The ruling reinforces
California’s “economic loss rule,” which bars plaintiffs from recovering
pure economic losses under a negligence theory without personal injury,
property damage or a special relationship. Although the decision may not
affect claims for actual personal injuries or physical damage to property
directly resulting from a leak at a gas storage facility or other oil and gas
production, transportation or storage facilities, the court’s affirmation of the
bar on the recovery of solely economic damages may limit the scope of
potential negligence claims by persons and businesses whose only injury
20. Senate Bill No. 809, Stats. 2017, Chapter 521. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/
faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB809
21. Assembly Bill No. 1328, Stats. 2017, Chapter 758. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/
faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB1328
22. Assembly Bill No. 398; Stats. 2017, Chapter 135. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/
faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB398
23. __Cal.App.5th __; __ Cal.Rptr.3d___; 2017 WL 6398546 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 15,
2017).
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resulting from a leak or spill was economic, such as lost revenues or a
decrease in property value.
The court in Association of Irritated Residents v. Department of
Conservation,24 reversed the sustaining of a demurrer on res judicata
grounds in a lawsuit filed by environmental groups challenging the
challenging DOGGR’s issuance of drilling permits for new wells on the
basis of a categorical exemption or negative declarations under the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA),25 since the prior judgment
of dismissal was not based on the merits, but on mootness and un-ripeness.
The district court in State of California v. United States Bureau of Land
Management,26 held that the Bureau of Land Management violated the
federal Administrative Procedures Act27 when, as part of the Department of
Interior’s implementation28 of the President Trump’s March 28, 2017
Executive Order No. 13783,29 the BLM postponed the compliance dates for
certain sections of the Bureau’s Waste Prevention, Production Subject to
Royalties, and Resource Conservation Rule relating to the venting, flaring,
and royalty-free use of gas, after the rule’s effective date had already
passed.30
The court in Committee to Protect our Agricultural Water v. Occidental
Oil And Gas Corporation31 dismissed a complaint alleging that large
California oil and production companies had conspired with Governor
Edmund G. Brown, Kern County and DOGGR to “illegally increase oil
production and maximize profits and tax revenue by allowing oil companies
to inject salt water into fresh water in violation of the SDWA.” 32 The court
concluded that the claims against the government official-defendants were
barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, that the
plaintiffs did not have standing to assert their RICO claims and that the
plaintiffs failed to properly allege either a RICO enterprise or conspiracy or
a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO or federal civil rights claims.
24. 11 Cal.App.5th 1202; 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
25. CALIFORNIA PUB. RESOURCES CODE, § 21000 et seq.
26. 277 F.Supp.3d 1106; 2017 WL 4416409 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
27. 5 USC §§ 551, et seq.
28. Secretarial Order No. 3349. https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/so_
3349_-american_energy_independence.pdf.
29. 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (March 28, 2017).
30. 82 Fed. Reg. 27,430-01 (June 15, 2017) (“Waste Prevention, Production Subject to
Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates.”)
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-06-15/pdf/2017-12325.pdf.
31. 235 F.Supp.3d 1132 (E.D. Cal. 2017).
32. Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
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C. Administrative Developments
Although not completed in 2017, DOGGR pursued a number of
substantial rulemaking initiatives, including updating its Idle Wells
Regulations33, as required by AB 2729,34 its gas pipeline regulations,35 as
required by Assembly Bill No. 1420. 36 DOGGR’s most significant current
effort is its permanent rulemaking to modify its regulations implementing
the Division's Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program 37 to cover not
only water injection and disposal wells, but also steam injection wells,
which are essential for the production of the heavy crude oil produced in
the Central Valley. In response to the gas leak at the 2015 Aliso Canyon
gas storage facility, DOGGR adopted emergency regulations in 2016
requiring that gas storage facilities in California meet new safety and
reliability measures. DOGGR is developing permanent regulations to build
on the emergency regulations.38
IV. Colorado
A. Judicial Developments
Martinez v. Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission39 potentially
could change the focus of the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission (COGCC). In that case, the court rejected the COGCC’s
assertion that its role under Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act40 is to
balance oil and gas development with other public interests such as public
health, safety and welfare. In 2013, members of Earth Guardians petitioned
for a rulemaking, proposing that the COGCC
not issue any permits for the drilling of a well for oil and gas
unless the best available science demonstrates, and an
independent, third party organization confirms, that drilling can
occur in a manner that does not cumulatively, with other actions,
impair Colorado’s atmosphere, water, wildlife, and land
33. http://www.conservation.ca.gov/dog/general_information/Pages/IdleWells.aspx
34. Stats. 2016, Chapter 272. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml
?bill_id=201520160AB2729
35. http://www.conservation.ca.gov/dog/general_information/Pages/Pipelines.aspx
36. Stats. 2015, Chapter 601 https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml
?bill_id=201520160AB1420
37. http://www.conservation.ca.gov/dog/general_information/Pages/UICupdate.aspx
38. http://www.conservation.ca.gov/dog/general_information/Pages/UGSRules.aspx
39. No. 16CA0564, 2017 WL 1089556 (Colo. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2017).
40. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 34-60-101, et seq.
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resources, does not adversely impact human health and does not
contribute to climate change.41
After receiving written comments and holding a hearing, the COGCC
denied the petition, finding that the proposed rule mandated action that was
beyond the limited statutory authority delegated to the COGCC in the Act.
Petitioners appealed to district court, which affirmed the COGCC’s denial
of the petition. The appellate court reversed in a split 2-1 decision. The
court cited language in the Act stating that it is in the public interest
to“[f]oster the responsible, balanced development, production, and
utilization of … oil and gas … in a manner consistent with protection of
public health, safety, and welfare, including protection of the environment
and wildlife resources.”42 Focusing on the phrase “in a manner consistent
with” and modifications to the Act over time, the court concluded that the
Act does not establish a test under which the COGCC is to balance oil and
gas production with other public interests, but instead sets out a condition
that must be fulfilled. The court held that “the clear language of the Act …
mandates that the development of oil and gas in Colorado be regulated
subject to the protection of public health, safety and welfare, including
protection of the environment and wildlife resources.”43 The Colorado
Attorney General appealed this decision to the Colorado Supreme Court
over the objection of Colorado’s governor. As of the date of this writing,
the court has not determined whether to accept certiorari.
Bill Barrett Corporation v. YMC Royalty Company, LP44 involved a suit
by the operator to recover a non-operator’s share of the cost of drilling two
oil and gas wells in Weld County. A representative of the non-operator had
signed AFE proposal letters electing to participate in each of the wells and
had signed and initialed the AFEs. However, the parties had not agreed on
the terms of, and thus had not executed, a joint operating agreement. In the
context of cross motions for summary judgment by the parties, the federal
district court rejected the non-operator’s claim that, absent a joint operating
agreement, the operator can recover its drilling costs only from production
from the wells. The court rejected the claim that AFEs cannot form a
binding contract as a matter of law, and that the proposal letters and AFEs
were fatally incomplete as contracts because they are silent regarding when
the obligation to pay arises, how and when payment is to be made, and the
41.
42.
43.
44.

Martinez, 2017 WL 1089556, at *2.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(1)(a)(I).
Martinez, 2017 WL 1089556, at *7.
301 F.Supp.3d 976 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 2016).
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terms of payment. Since the wells already had been drilled, the court found
those payment terms to be “of no apparent consequence” to the lawsuit.
In Maralex Resources, Inc. v. Jewell,45 the court held that the Interior
Board of Land Appeals’ (IBLA) finding that the Federal Oil and Gas
Management Act of 1982 (FOGRMA)46 authorizes Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) representatives to conduct warrantless, unannounced
inspections of oil wells on the plaintiffs’ fee land was not arbitrary,
capricious or otherwise contrary to law. The fee oil and gas leases covering
plaintiffs’ land had been committed by the lessee to a communitization
agreement, and the IBLA had concluded that nothing in FOGRMA
“precludes BLM … from inspecting non-Federal/non-Indian lease sites, for
the purpose of determining whether oil or gas production from … [said]
lands is being accurately recorded and reported … when that production is
properly attributable to Federal or Indian lands, under … communitization
agreements.”47 While the inspection directive in FOGRMA48 refers only to
“lease sites on Federal or Indian lands,” the court cited the fact that
production from any lease site subject to a communitization agreement is
deemed to occur on each lease site within the communitization agreement.
The court also concluded that the BLM’s access did not violate plaintiffs’
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure, given the limited
purposes for which BLM was granted access to their land.49
A-W Land Co., LLC v. Anadarko E&P Company LP50 addressed issues
relating to the surface use reservation in deeds to surface owners by Union
Pacific Railroad Company. After Anadarko acquired Union Pacific’s
reserved mineral interest and the Colorado Supreme Court decided
McCormick v. Union Pacific Resources Co.,51 Anadarko discontinued
Union Pacific’s practice of negotiating surface owner’s agreements under
which surface owners received royalty payments on minerals extracted
under their lands. Plaintiffs, which represented a class of surface owners
within the Wattenberg oil field in northeastern Colorado, sued alleging that
Anadarko’s use of the surface of their lands to access the subsurface
minerals exceeds the scope of the surface reservation in the underlying
45. No. 15-cv-01893, 2017 WL 6033694 (D. Colo. Oct. 19, 2017).
46. 30 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq.
47. Maralex, 2016 WL 8310098, at *4.
48. 30 U.S.C. § 1718(b).
49. Maralex, 2016 WL 8310098, at *6.
50. No. 09-cv-02293-MSK-MJW, 2017 WL 1023375 (D. Colo. Mar. 16, 2017).
51. 14 P.3d 346 (Colo. 2000) (holding that a reservation “all coal and other minerals”
contained in the Union Pacific deeds included oil and gas).
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deeds, and thus constitutes trespass under Colorado law. The court ruled
that the language “convenient or necessary” contained in the deed clause
relating to use of the land was to be construed from the mineral owner’s
point of view only.52 The court indicated that it had resolved the issues that
are capable of resolution on a class-wide basis and dissolved the plaintiff
class but did not grant summary judgment; thus, the various plaintiffs could
proceed to trial on liability and damages individually. In advance of a jury
trial involving the claims of surface owners Marvin and Mildred Bay, the
court addressed in a separate opinion objections by the parties to anticipated
expert testimony.53 The case is now on appeal to the Tenth Circuit.
Two cases involved claims that a producer failed to comply with the
terms of a prior settlement of a royalty class action. The dispute in EnCana
Oil & Gas (USA), Inc. v. Miller54 arose out of a 2008 settlement of a royalty
class action55 which, among other things, established the methodology the
producer would use for future royalty payments and included an arbitration
clause. After approving the settlement agreement, the district court had
dismissed the suit with prejudice. In 2016, certain royalty owners filed a
demand for arbitration alleging that the producer had underpaid royalties
owed to members of the class in violation of the 2008 settlement
agreement. The producer filed suit, asserting that the class had ceased to
exist when the prior case was dismissed with prejudice in 2008, and that the
settlement agreement did not authorize arbitration on a class-wide basis.
The district court ruled for the royalty owners, and the court of appeals
affirmed. The court determined that the class survived the 2008 dismissal,
since compliance with the settlement order became part of the order of
dismissal and the district court retains jurisdiction to give effect to it, and
because the settlement agreement continues for the lives of the applicable
leases.56 Analyzing the language of the settlement agreement as a whole,
the court also concluded that the producer’s claim that the settlement
agreement should be interpreted to require bilateral, as opposed to classwide, arbitration was contrary to the plain meaning of that agreement.

52. A-W Land Co., 2017 WL 10233375, at *6.
53. A-W Land Co., LLC v. Anadarko E&P Co., No. 09-cv-02293-MSK-MJW, 2017
WL 4161278 (D. Colo. Sept. 20, 2017).
54. 16CA1979, 2017 WL 3431822 (Colo. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2017).
55. Miller v. EnCana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., No. 05CV2753 (City & Cty. of Denver
Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 2008).
56. EnCana, 2017 WL 3831822, at *4.
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The second case, Phelps Oil & Gas, LLC v. Noble Energy, Inc.,57 arose
after the producer audited DCP Midstream, LP (DCP), which provides postwellhead services for the producer under percentage of proceeds (POP)
agreements. In the audit, the producer initially identified $34 million of
potential underpayments, then entered into a settlement agreement with
DCP that modified the terms of the POP agreements and included DCP’s
agreement to commit $17.5 million to make improvements to its gas
processing and transportation infrastructure. A party to a 2007 royalty class
action settlement with the producer sued on behalf of the class claiming that
it was entitled to royalties on the full amount claimed by the producer in the
DCP audit. The court held that there was no basis to conclude that the
royalty owner was entitled to a royalty on the full $34 million asserted by
the producer in the DCP audit but not paid to it by DCP. However, the court
refused to grant the producer’s summary judgment motion on the royalty
owner’s breach of contract claim that related to DCP’s promise to invest
$17.5 million in infrastructure primarily for the benefit of the producer,
concluding that genuine issues of fact remain as to whether that is the basis
for a payment of royalties to the royalty owner.
In Crichton v. Augustus Energy Resources, L.L.C.,58 the court rejected a
producer’s motion to dismiss a royalty class action against it on the grounds
that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies before the
COGCC prior to filing the case. The court found that the dispute was
contractual in nature, and cited language in the Act providing that the
COGCC is precluding from exercising jurisdiction over any controversy
involving bona fide dispute regarding contract interpretation.59 The court
also affirmed that language in the Act stating that the COGCC must make a
determination of whether a bona fide contract dispute exists before
exercising jurisdiction does not require a COGCC determination that the
dispute is contractual in nature before a dispute may be filed in district
court.60
Finally, there were two oil and gas tax cases. In Kinder Morgan Co2 Co.,
L.P. v. Montezuma County Board of Commissioners,61 the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the Colorado statute authorizing retroactive
taxation of oil and gas leaseholds when “taxable property has been omitted

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

No. 14-cv-2604-REB-CBS, 2017 WL 4333298 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2017).
No. 15-cv-00835-KLM, 2017 WL 4838735 (D. Colo. Oct. 26, 2017).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *4.
396 P.3d 657 (Colo. 2017).
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from the assessment roll”62 allows retroactive taxation when a leaseholder
correctly reported the volume of oil or gas sold but underreported the
wellhead selling price of the oil or gas. In an unpublished decision in Oxy
USA Inc. v. Mesa County Board of Commissioners,63 the Colorado Supreme
Court held that the statute authorizing abatement of taxes for any
overvaluation64 allows abatement even when the overvaluation is caused by
taxpayer error.
C. Administrative Developments
Following a home explosion in April 2017 caused by an abandoned oil
and gas flowline connected to an active well that killed two people and
injured a third person, COGCC issued a notice requiring operators to
inspect systematically their inventory of existing flowlines and verify that
any existing flowline not in active use is abandoned.65 The notice also
required operators to document the location of all existing flowlines located
within 1000 feet of a building unit and ensure and document that those lines
have integrity.66 At the request of Governor Hickenlooper, COGCC
undertook a three-month review of oil and gas operations in Colorado after
the home explosion. On August 22, 2017, the Governor announced seven
policy initiatives growing out of this review.67 Two of these initiatives
(strengthening COGCC’s flowline regulations and enhancing the 8-1-1
“one call” program) are to be implemented through a COGCC rulemaking.
COGCC is in the process of a rulemaking to implement changes to its
flowline and safety rules.
V. Kansas
A. Judicial Developments
A long-running dispute in Northern Natural Gas Company v. L.D.
Drilling, Inc.68 has clarified Kansas rules relating to gas storage. This case
62. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-5-125(1).
63. No. 16SC51, 2017 WL 5248199 (Colo. Nov. 13, 2017).
64. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-10-114(1)(a)(I)(A).
65. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, Notice to Operators Statewide, Flowlines
or Pipelines (May 2, 2017).
66. Id.
67. Gov. Hickenlooper announces State’s response following review of oil and gas
operations, https://www.colorado.gov/governor/news/gov-hickenlooper-announces-state%
E2%80%99s-response-following-review-oil-and-gas-operations.
68. 862 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2017).
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arises out of Northern Natural’s condemnation pursuant to the federal
Natural Gas Act,69 of approximately 9,000 acres for its natural gas storage
operation. The court appointed a commission to determine the
compensation due to the owners of rights in the condemned subsurface
area. The court directed the commission that K.S.A. 55-1210 vested the
subsurface owners with title to gas that Northern Natural placed in storage
beneath their land as of the time of the condemnation.70 The Tenth Circuit,
in reviewing the district court’s ruling adopting the compensation report of
the commission, reversed the decision. The Circuit Court awarded
compensation to surface owners for Northern Natural’s gas in place beneath
their land as of the date of the taking which was March 30, 2012, and for
any right to produce the gas from their land after the “date of certification”
of the area for gas storage, which was June 2, 2010. This decision is
consistent with the holding in Union Gas Systems Inc. v. Carnahan.71 The
district court did not follow the Union Gas case because the decision
predated the enactment of K.S.A. 55-1210. The court in Union Gas noted
that prior to the certification of an area for gas storage, the subsurface
owners’ basic property right is the exercise of its right to capture and
extract migrating storage gas. Once the area is certified as a gas storage
area, the capture rights end and the gas storage condemnation statutes–as
interpreted by the Union Gas court—do not require compensation for the
migrating storage gas. The court confirmed the award for the acreage
acquired as a storage area buffer zone for Northern Natural’s existing gas
storage and also affirmed the district court’s refusal to award attorneys’ fees
finding that the tendered statutory basis for fees did not apply.
The case of LCL, LLC v. Falen,72 Falen had in June 2007 listed land for
sale with Rice Abstract instructing that the seller would retain all mineral
rights. The land was subject to a producing oil and gas lease. In November
of that year, Falen entered into a contract to sell the land which provided
that the seller would retain all mineral rights for twenty years after
production ceases. Rice Abstract issued a title commitment to the buyer that
did not list the excepted mineral interest. In January 2008, Rice Abstract
drafted and filed the deed of record to complete the sale. The deed did not
contain the mineral exception. Because Falen continued to receive royalties
under the existing oil and gas lease, the error was not discovered
69. 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq.
70. .N. Natural Gas Co. v. Approximately 9,117 in Pratt, Kingman, and Reno Counties,
Kansas, 2 Supp. 3d 1174 (D. Kan. 2014).
71. 774 P.2d 962 (Kan. 1989).
72. 390 P.3d 571 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017).
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immediately. Falen made purported conveyances of the minerals to others
in 2008, 2010 and 2012. In 2014, the grantee sold its interest in the land to
LCL. A member of LCL stated that they understood the mineral rights did
not go with the property. Rice Abstract provided title insurance and acted as
the closing agent for the sale. When the sale was closed, there was no
mention of the mineral interests in the deed or the title commitment. LCL
later inquired about the minerals and Rice Abstract discovered its errors. In
2014, LCL asserted a right to the mineral rights under its title insurance
policy. Falen did not discover the failure to except the mineral interests in
the 2008 conveyance until 2014. LCL sued to quiet title to the mineral
interests. Falen counterclaimed to quiet its title to the mineral interests and
also filed a third-party suit against Rice Abstract for negligence, breach of
implied contract and breach of fiduciary duty. LCL and Falen reached a
settlement. The district court found that all claims against Rice Abstract
were barred by the statute of limitations. In a set of findings too lengthy to
describe in this brief case summary, the court of appeals concluded that
certain of the claims against Rice Abstract were not barred by statutes of
limitation.
In In re Protest of Barker73 the issue was whether ad valorem tax may be
assessed on oil and gas equipment that is associated with a lease that is
exempt from tax under Kansas’ low-production exemption. In Kansas, oil
and gas leases are classified as personal property for the purpose of ad
valorem tax.74 K.S.A. 79-201t(a) provides an exemption from ad valorem
taxes for all oil leases, other than royalty interests therein, the average daily
production from which is three barrels or less per producing well or five
barrels or less per producing well which has a completion depth of 2,000
feet or more. Kansas construes exemptions from taxation strictly against the
taxpayer. The court of appeals found that ad valorem taxation seeks to
value the oil and gas lease by determining the present worth of the lease’s
future production. Therefore, the issue of first impression was whether
equipment used in the production of oil is considered part of an “oil lease”
for purposes of tax exemption. The court found that there is nothing in the
statutory scheme or case law expressly stating that equipment is included in
the definition of “oil lease” for the purposes of tax exemption. Instead,
various statutes suggest that equipment is not included in that definition.
The court concluded that the equipment is not considered part of an “oil
lease” as that term is used in K.S.A. 2016, Supp. 79-201t.
73. 398 P.3d 870 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017).
74. K.S.A. 79–329.
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The case of In re Estate of Bush75considered the effect of K.S.A. 582202 which provides “every conveyance of real estate shall pass all estate
of the grantor therein, unless the intent to pass a less estate shall expressly
appear or be necessarily implied in the terms of the grant.” In this case, one
daughter, Debbie, inherited eighty acres in fee from her father. In order to
carry out her father’s wishes, Debbie conveyed forty acres to her sister,
Judy, and also conveyed an undivided one-half interest in the oil and gas in
the entire eighty acres while retaining a one-half interest in herself. The
producing wells were not distributed equally throughout the eighty-acre
tract. The intent was to allow both daughters to share equally in the
production from the eighty acres. Debbie later gifted her interest in the land
to Bush using a deed that conveyed the entire eighty acres but excepted the
forty-acre tract previously conveyed to Judy. There was no mention of
Debbie’s undivided one-half interest in the eighty acres. Bush then
conveyed the property to himself and Debbie as joint tenants using the same
deed language. Bush survived Debbie, however, Judy, as her sole heir,
asserted that the one-half mineral interest in the eighty-acre tract was not
affected by the conveyance to Bush. The district court found that once the
one-half mineral interest had been created in the eighty-acre tract, a
conveyance would not encompass the mineral interest unless it was
expressly referenced in the deed. The court of appeals reversed holding that
the settled rule in Kansas states that severed mineral interests are
transferred with the land unless they have been specifically identified in the
deed and excluded from the transfer. Therefore, the deeds included all of
Debbie’s ownership in the eighty-acre tract excluding the forty acres owned
by Judy.
The case of Lewis v. Kansas Production Company76 involved a 1972 oil
and gas lease. In 1994, the lessee, Roberts, assigned the rights below the
then producing formation to McCann with the lessee retaining the shallow
rights. In 2005, the lessor sued McCann, the owner of the deep rights, to
terminate McCann’s rights to the lease. In 2009, the court gave McCann the
option to explore the deep rights or terminate the lease. In 2010, McCann
drilled the required well which did not produce. In 2013, the lessors filed
the lawsuit at issue in this matter asserting a breach of the implied covenant
to explore and develop, a claim the lease was not maintained by Roberts’
production and for attorneys’ fees under K.S.A. 55-201 and 55-202. Prior to
2015, Roberts ceased producing and relinquished his leasehold interest in
75. No. 115,850 & No. 115,851, 2017 WL 1105397 (Kan. Ct. App. March 24, 2017).
76. No. 115,174, 2017 WL 3575551 (Kan. Ct. App. August 18, 2017).
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the upper formations. At trial in 2015, the Court held that McCann had
breached the implied covenant to develop and explore, that the lease
terminated and that the lessors were entitled to statutory attorney fees. The
parties had stipulated that the Deep Horizons Act77 applied and that
McCann, as the holder of the deep rights, had the burden of proving
reasonable exploration and development by a preponderance of the
evidence. In analyzing the implied covenant to explore or develop, the court
found that compliance could only relate to the time frame from the district
court’s July 2009, order to the time the suit was filed in November 2013.78
The court held that the lessee’s obligation to develop would be suspended
since the lessor had filed suit to challenge its lease. The court was not
impressed by the actions of McCann, the owner of the deep rights, who
waited until demand was made by the lessors to cause the well drilled in
2010, to be logged and analyzed by an expert. The court found that this was
“too little, too late to satisfy the implied covenant to explore and develop as
imposed in the Deep Horizons Act.”79 The court of appeals found that the
district court had the discretionary authority to terminate the assigned
portion of the lease under K.S.A. 55-226.
In the case of Jenkins v. Chi. Pac. Corp.80, the court affirmed the rule
which has existed in Kansas since approximately 1905, that when a railroad
company acquires a strip of land for a right-of-way, it generally takes only
an easement. This is the rule whether the strip is acquired by condemnation
or by deed. When the railroad abandons the right-of-way, the estate reverts
to the original landowners. This rule applies when the deed shows that the
property was conveyed for use as right-of-way for a railroad.
VI. Louisiana
A. Judicial Developments
Louisiana law defines a mineral servitude as “the right of enjoyment of
land belonging to another for the purpose of exploring for and producing
minerals and reducing them to possession and ownership.”81 In Smith, et al.
v. Andrews, et al., there is an in-depth discussion about the nature of
77. K.S.A. 55–223 to 55–229.
78. This is likely to be incorrect. The last appropriate time frame would be from the date
the last well was drilled exploring the deep rights which was in 2010, until the suit was filed
in November 2013.
79. K.S.A. 55-223.
80. 403 P.3d 1213 (Kan. 2017).
81. See LA. R.S. 31:21.
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mineral servitudes, and what kind of factual evidence will be sufficient to
find that a mineral servitude has not prescribed for non-use.82 While the
facts are somewhat complicated, the basic dispute revolved around a claim
by the Andrews parties to be the mineral owners of the subject property in
the wake of the Haynesville Shale boom. After a bench trial, the district
court concluded that the testimony of Mr. Andrews was “completely
lacking in credibility and ruled in favor of the servitude owners (the Smith
parties)."83 This ruling was upheld on appeal, and the Louisiana Supreme
Court denied review of the matter. The court explained that “Mr. Andrews
gave several inconsistent versions of what he contended happened to
Rogers No. 1 Well.”84 In ruling on various issues, the court confirmed that
the servitude owners bore the burden of establishing maintenance of the
servitude. The court concluded the servitude owners met their burden of
proof that the servitude had been maintained. The court found the servitude
owners met this burden by virtue of the assignee’s testimony that any
actions he undertook on the property were done with the intent to act not
only for himself, but also for the servitude owners.
In Gladney v. Anglo-Dutch Energy, L.L.C.,85 the court examined how a
lease royalty should be paid after the conditional allowable was granted but
before the effective date of the Commissioner of Conservation’s unitization
order granting such an allowable. The lease at issue provided for a 1/5
royalty. The lessee drilled a well and then applied for the creation of a
compulsory unit with Office of Conservation, along with a conditional
allowable. The conditional allowable was granted on May 17, 2012.
Pursuant to the allowable, revenue from first production, subject to the
outcome of the unit application, was to be disbursed based upon the results
of the unitization proceeding. The unit order was also issued “effective on
and after October 30, 2012.”86 The Third Circuit concluded that the lessee
was obligated to pay the 1/5 lease-basis royalty on all production, as
opposed to paying the royalty on production from a unit-tract basis, from
the date of first production to the effective date of the unit. The court cited
testimony from the presiding officer of the unitization hearing who
expressly stated that a conditional allowable does not prejudice the

82. 215 So. 3d 868 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/15/17), writ denied, 220 So. 3d 749 (La. 5/19/17).
83. Id. at 874.
84. Id.
85. 210 So. 3d 903 (La. Ct. App. December 21, 2016), writ denied, 218 So. 3d 120 (La.
April 13, 2017).
86. Id.
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contractual rights as between the lessor and lessee. The trial court decision
was reversed in favor of the lessor.
Multiple courts have recently interpreted Louisiana Revised Statutes
30:103.1 et seq., which is a reporting statute with an accompanying penalty.
That statutory regime creates rights and obligations as between an operator
of a unit well and certain unleased interests included within a “force
pooled” oil and gas unit. Specifically, in TDX Energy the court held that La.
R.S. 30:103.1 et seq. applies only to tracts included in a unit that are not
subject to an oil and gas lease, whether by the operator of the well or any
other third party.87 However, Louisiana’s Third Circuit court of appeal in
XXI Oil & Gas found that other working-interest owners were “unleased”
vis-a-vis the operator of the unit well and thus, have a right to make
demand under La. R.S. 30:103.1 et seq.88 Both of these decisions were the
subject of appeal. Writ of Certiorari was denied by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in XXI Oil & Gas.89 In TDX Energy, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the
Western District’s earlier decision in light of the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s writ denial in XXI Oil & Gas. Initially, the Fifth Circuit noted the
absence of a controlling decision from the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Accordingly, the court attempted to determine how the highest court of the
state would resolve the issue by deferring to the intermediate Louisiana
courts. In an opinion that embraced the rationale in XXI Oil & Gas, the
court concluded that the only logical reading of the statute’s plain language
provides rights under La. R.S. 30:103.1 et seq. to any oil and gas interest
owners that do not have a lease with the operator.
In Guilbeau v. Hess Corporation,90 the Fifth Circuit had occasion to
examine the subsequent purchaser doctrine in the context of an oilfield
legacy case. The defendants conducted oil and gas operations on the
plaintiff’s property until 1971, and the oil and gas lease at issue expired in
1973. Subsequently, in 2007, plaintiff purchased the property at issue, and
the sale did not contain any express assignment of the personal rights to sue
for pre-purchase damages. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging claims of
environmental contamination from historic oil and gas operations. In
response, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that
plaintiff’s claims were barred by the subsequent purchaser doctrine. The
87. TDX Energy, LLC v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 2016 WL 1179206 (W.D. La.
March 24, 2016).
88. XXI Oil & Gas, LLC v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 206 So. 3d 885 (La. Ct. App.
September 28, 2016).
89. XXI Oil & Gas, LLC v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 216 So. 3d 814 (La. March 24, 2017).
90. 854 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. April 18, 2017).
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court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the Louisiana Supreme Court
decision in Eagle Pipe & Supply Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp. and its
progeny created any uncertainty in the law.91 Instead, the Fifth Circuit
found there was a clear consensus among Louisiana appellate courts
applying Eagle Pipe to expired mineral leases. Thus, pursuant to Eagle
Pipe and Louisiana appellate court decisions, the subsequent purchaser
doctrine barred plaintiff’s claims for damages related to conduct prior to the
assignment in favor of plaintiff.
Res nova issues relating to the interpretation of La. R.S. 30:29,
commonly referred to as “Act 312,” in an oilfield legacy suit were
addressed in The Sweet Lake Land and Oil Co., et al. v. Oleum Operating
Co., L.C.,92 This decision resulted from a supervisory writ application by
the defendants who were cast in judgment for remediation by an earlier jury
verdict. After the judgment ordered the defendants to submit a remedial
plan to the regulatory agency, Louisiana Department of Natural Resources
(LDNR), the LDNR held a public hearing and issued what it considered to
be the Most Feasible Plan (the LDNR Most Feasible Plan). The defendants
moved to adopt the LDNR Most Feasible Plan as the final plan under Act
312. The trial court, however, rejected the LDNR Most Feasible Plan and
instead ordered LDNR to perform additional work because the plan was
only partially a remediation plan. The issue on appeal was whether the trial
court can order LDNR to re-submit a plan for remediation when the
judgment called for such a plan and the originally submitted plan still
requires evaluation. This required interpretation of Act 312 and
consideration of “several res nova issues regarding the authority and roles
of the trial court and LDNR after LDNR files its most feasible plan in the
trial court record.”93 The court held there was no error in the trial court’s
order requiring LDNR to submit a plan for remediation of issues instead of
further testing where the judgment called for a remediation plan. The court
relied on dicta from a Louisiana Supreme Court decision which indicated
that “[t]hroughout the remediation process, the court remains the gatekeeper
to ensure the purpose of the Act is accomplished – remediation of the
property to the extent of the public’s interest.”94

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 312–13.
229 So. 3d 993 (La. Ct. App. 10/18/2017).
Id.
Id.
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VII. New Mexico
A. Judicial Developments
In T.H. McElvain Oil & Gas LP v. Benson-Montin-Greer Drilling
Corp.,95 the court refused to set aside a 1948 final judgment in a quiet title
case. Plaintiffs were the successors to three joint tenants who reserved all of
the oil and gas underlying a 160-acre tract when conveying that tract in
1931. In 1948, the 1931 grantee’s successor sought to quiet fee simple title
to a larger tract which included the 160 acres. The court file from the 1948
action revealed a complaint verified by the plaintiff and an affidavit from
the New Mexico county sheriff both averring that various defendants,
including the three joint tenants or their unknown heirs, could not be
located after a due and diligent search. There was no description of any
efforts undertaken in that search. Plaintiffs proved that, in 1948, the
surviving joint tenant still resided in the same California city recited in the
1931 deed, although under her married name, and could have been located
with a truly diligent search. Judgment was entered by default in 1948 after
notice by publication. The court found that the court file did not reveal any
constitutionally defective effort at searching for parties, that the number of
plaintiffs varies as to how a diligent search could have located the surviving
joint tenant in 1948, many of those efforts were more appropriate to modern
technology and availability of information, and that plaintiffs did not
provide evidence of a “direct path” under which the 1948 plaintiff could
have ascertained the “identity and whereabouts” of the surviving joint
tenant to persuade the court of an obvious lack of diligence.96 The court
cited a policy to protect reliance interests in property transactions created
by old quiet title judgments.
In Abraham v. WPX Energy Production, LLC,97 plaintiff sought to certify
a class action for royalty and overriding royalty owners related to WPX’s
alleged practice of WPX paying royalty and overriding royalty on a
wellhead BTU value rather than paying on the value of natural gas liquids
subsequently taken from the gas stream. Plaintiff proposed a class
consisting of all overriding royalty and royalty owners paid by WPX from
August 2006 forward with two subclasses: those covered by “proceeds”
instruments and “market value” instruments.98 The court ruled that the
95.
96.
97.
98.

388 P.3d 240 (N.M. 2017), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1584 (2017).
Id. at 252.
322 F.R.D. 592, 2017 WL 4402398 (D.N.M. 2017).
Id. at *4-6.
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proposed class lacked commonality and that common issues would not
predominate. Commonality was not present first because plaintiff could not
demonstrate that the language in form oil and gas leases was substantively
the same as the language in overriding royalty instruments which are not
generally reserved on preprinted preexisting forms. Second, the court found
that the duty of good faith and fair dealing and breach of implied covenant
to market claims were not common because the court would be required to
examine the language of individual instruments to determine whether there
was a duty to pay royalties on extracted NGLs. Third, the court found that
civil conspiracy claims lacked commonality because the division of all
instruments into the simple categories of “proceeds” and “market value”
was insufficient to describe legal relationships between the parties. Finally,
the court held that, while there were some common issues, they would not
predominate finding that evidence regarding lease language variation would
likely consume most time at a trial.
In XTO Energy, Inc. v. Furth,99 XTO sought restitution for overpayments
it had made on a production payment reserved in 1964 covering 920-acres
of land at $1,000.00 per acre. In 1985, the production payment was
bequeathed to three testamentary trusts for the benefit of the owner’s
daughters. The prior operator paid approximately one-half of the production
payment and that XTO paid an additional $1.9 million dollars on the
production payment before it fully realized its mistake. Defendants argued
that the restitution claim was barred by XTO’s negligence. The court found
that the overpayments could have been avoided by an exercise of due
diligence, but that no bar existed because the voluntary payment rule
required actual knowledge that the production payment had been satisfied
when the payments occurred. However, the court denied plaintiff complete
summary judgment as equitable considerations, namely that the beneficiary
of the trusts were elderly women who rely on the trusts for financial support
and medical care and that the trusts assets were less than the amount of
restitution claimed, so that trial was needed on the equities as to the
amount, if any, of restitution.
The bankruptcy case of In Re Franco100 concerned a debtor and her
husband who had conveyed to their son a portion of a tract of land under
which they owned an undivided half interest in the minerals. The deed was
not clear as to whether minerals were conveyed or reserved. The widow
filed for bankruptcy protection. The son’s surviving wife sued the widow to
99. 2017 WL 5891740 (D.N.M. 2017).
100. 574 B.R. 730 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2017).
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quiet title to the minerals and obtained a state court judgment. The
bankruptcy court held that the automatic stay rendered the judgment void
and declined to annul the automatic stay as it would remove a “potentially
valuable asset” from the estate.
B. Administrative Developments
The New Mexico Oil Conservation Division issued a Notice101 to
operators May 5, 2017 specifying that oil gathering lines as subject to
health and safety regulations that previously were understood to apply to
gas gathering lines. The Division also eliminated New Mexico’s
requirement of an individual form for reporting of the hydraulic fracturing
content used in well completion. Effective September 26, 2017, New
Mexico operators are required to file with the FracFocus Chemical
Disclosure Registry.102
VIII. Ohio
A. Judicial Developments
As in prior years, the Supreme Court of Ohio remained engaged with oil
and gas issues in 2017. The case of Bohlen v. Anadarko E&P Onshore,
L.L.C.,103 involved the lessors’ claim that delayed rental payments and
minimum royalty payments under their lease were functional equivalents
such that the failure to pay a minimum royalty resulted in the lease’s
automatic termination. Disagreeing, the court held that the clauses operated
independently of one another and that a shortfall in the lessor’s minimum
royalty did not cause the lease to expire.
Ohio’s appellate courts also heard a number of oil and gas related cases
this year. In Paulus v. Beck Energy Corp.,104 the court addressed, as a
matter of first impression, a number of issues concerning Ohio’s standard
for determining whether an oil and gas lease is producing in paying
quantities. The court found, among other things, that (i) the determination
of the period of time used to measure paying quantities is made by
examining the totality of the circumstances and requires consideration of
101. Notice to Oil and Gas Operators, State of New Mexico Energy, Minerals and
Natural Resources Department (May 5, 2017) http://www.emnrd.state.nm.us/OCD/
documents/201705-05NoticetoOilandGasOperatorsOilfieldGatheringLines.pdf.
102. NMAC 19.15.16.19 (2017).
103. 80 N.E.3d 468, 469 (Ohio 2017).
104. No. 16 MO 0008, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 2750, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 16,
2017).
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the good faith of the lessee; (ii) royalties paid to the lessor must be deducted
either from the lessee’s gross income or included as operating expenses
when determining profitability; and (iii) that while an individual lessee’s
own labor is not an operating expense when the lessee made no direct
expenditure from gross receipts for his labor, the same is not true for the
labor of a corporate lessee’s salaried employee. Such labor is a direct
operating expense to be subtracted from the lessee’s income.
In a decision that garnered significant attention within the industry, the
court in Dundics v. Eric Petroleum Corp. ruled that landmen in Ohio were
required to obtain real estate broker’s licenses in order to be entitled to
compensation for brokering deals with landowners on behalf of oil and gas
companies.105 There, the plaintiff landmen alleged that they were not
compensated by the defendant oil and gas company for their work in
assisting the company with negotiating and obtaining oil and gas leases in
Ohio. The company moved to dismiss the lawsuit, asserting that the
landmen were not licensed Ohio real estate brokers, and therefore, were
barred from recovering under a state statute that precluded the recovery of
compensation for “real estate . . . brokerage transaction[s]” unless the
person brokering the transactions is a licensed real estate broker.106
Agreeing with the lower court, the appellate court held that “real estate,” for
purposes of the statute, was broadly defined to include “leaseholds as well
as any and every interest or estate in land”—which, under Ohio law,
includes oil and gas rights. And so, to be entitled to compensation for
brokering in oil and gas rights, the landmen needed to be licensed. The
court disagreed that the statute was inapplicable because oil and gas was
different from traditional real property, noting that “the fact that oil and gas
rights are different does not excuse third parties who ask the courts to
enforce their engagement with either owners of surface real estate or those
who wish to extract subsurface oil and gas from the real estate broker’s
license requirement at issue here.”107
A pre-civil war reservation was the subject of Sheba v. Kautz, which held
that a deed executed in 1848 reserving “all of the minerals and coal” did not
reserve oil and gas.108 In reaching its decision, the court turned to ordinary
principles of contract interpretation and drew upon the decision in Detlor v.

105.
106.
107.
108.
2017).

79 N.E.3d 569, 571 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017), appeal accepted, Nov 1, 2017.
See OHIO REV. CODE § 4735.21.
Dundics, 79 N.E.3d at 572.
No. 15 BE 0008, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 4032, at *36 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 18,
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Holland,109 to conclude that the parties to the deed did not intend to reserve
oil and gas because the deed predated the development of oil and gas in
Ohio. The court specifically noted that there was no indication that oil and
gas were being produced in the immediate vicinity or in the general area or
elsewhere when the deed was executed.
In Barclay Petro., Inc. v. Bailey, 110 the current owners of property
covered by a lease originally executed in 1985 sought to terminate the
lease, alleging it had expired for lack of commercial production some years
earlier, before the current owners had acquired the property. During that
period of non-commercial production, the lessee continued to operate and
maintain the well on the property, which also provided household gas. The
evidence showed that the prior owners of the property were content with the
supply of household gas, that household gas was continually supplied
without any pronged interruption and that the lessee properly remedied any
issue with the household gas supply. The lessee contended, among other
things, that the prior owners had agreed that the supply of household gas
would be sufficient to hold the lease, and that the doctrines of modification,
waiver and estoppel barred the current owners from claiming that the lease
expired. Reversing the trial court’s finding in favor of the lessee, the court
of appeals determined that the lease had expired on its own terms and that
no affirmative action was necessary on the part of the lessors to formally
cause the lease’s termination. Additionally, the court found that the lease
was not modified by the parties’ course of performance or by oral
agreement because the change in the parties’ understanding regarding the
lessee’s obligations was not supported by independent consideration.
Finally, the court rejected the equitable defenses of estoppel and waiver,
finding that the supply of household gas was a benefit under the lease, and
that the prior owners’ acceptance of benefits was not inconsistent with the
(subsequent) owners’ position that the lease had expired.
Rudolph v. Viking Int’l Res. Co. 111 involved a claim that an oil and gas
lease expired under its habendum clause due to an interruption in
production. One of the issues before the court was which statute of
limitations applied: the 21-year statute pertaining to the recovery of real
property, or the 15-year statute pertaining to actions on a written contract.
The court found that it was the 21-year statute, concluding that because an
oil and gas lease is regarded as a fee simple determinable interest, its
109. 49 N.E. 690 (Ohio 1898).
110. No. 16CA14, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 3878, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2017).
111. 84 N.E.3d 1066, 1069 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017).
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expiration does not necessarily give rise to a cause of action for a breach of
the lease. Instead, the appropriate action is one for a declaratory judgment
that the lease has expired, which is a claim in “the nature of an action to
recover title to or possession of real property” to which Ohio’s statute of
limitations for recovery of real property was applicable.112 But the court
determined that on the particular facts before it, the 21-year limitations
period had not yet lapsed. The court also went on to repudiate its earlier
statements in Schultheiss v. Heinrich Enterprises, Inc.,113 where it
suggested that no statute of limitations ever applied to a lease expiration
claim.
Blackstone v. Moore114 interpreted a statutory exception to “marketable
record title” under Ohio’s Marketable Title Act (OMTA), Ohio Rev. Code
§ 5301.47, et seq. The court held that whether a reference to an interest
inherent in the muniments of the chain of record title is “specific”—and
thus not extinguished by the OMTA, or general, depends upon four
factors: (1) does the reference state the type of mineral right created; (2)
does the reference state the nature of the encumbrance (an estate, profit,
lease, or easement); (3) does the reference state the original owner of the
interest; and (4) does the reference identify the instrument creating the
interest. In so holding, the court expressly rejected the decision of another
appellate district in Duvall v. Hibbs,115 which held that a reference to an
interest inherent in the muniments of the chain of record title is specific
only if it recites the volume and page number of the instrument creating the
interest.
Ohio courts continued to hear cases involving Ohio’s Dormant Mineral
Act (ODMA), Ohio Rev. Code § 5301.56, et seq. In a decision of first
impression, the court in Devitis v. Draper held that oil and gas royalty
interests may be abandoned under the ODMA.116 The court looked to its
prior decision in Pollock v. Mooney,117 which found that royalty interests
are subject to extinguishment under the OMTA. In Pollock, the court relied
on broad language in the OMTA that applied the act’s provisions to all
112.
113.
114.
2017).
115.
116.
2017).
117.
2014).

Id. at 1078.
57 N.E.3d 361, 367–368 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).
No. 14 MO 0001, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 2739, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 29,
No. CA-709, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 13042, at *4–5 (Ohio Ct. App. July 8, 1983).
No. 13 MO 0017, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 1131, at *26 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 20,
No. 13 MO 9, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 4350, at *21–22 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30,
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interests, claims, or charges whatsoever. While noting that the language of
the ODMA is different than the OMTA, the Draper court found that
parallels can be drawn” between the two statutes because the ODMA’s
definition of “mineral interest” was also broad and included the catch-all
phrase “regardless of how the interest is created and of the form of the
interest.” Moreover, the court found that conceptually, a royalty interest is
simply one stick within the bundle of attributes comprising the mineral
estate, and that it may be separately transferred. Therefore, a royalty interest
fell within the definition of a “mineral interest” under the ODMA.
Ultimately, the court went on to find that the particular royalty interest at
issue, while potentially subject to abandonment under the ODMA, was
preserved through the timely filing of a claim of preservation.
Courts also wrestled with the issue of whether certain parties were
“holders” under the ODMA, and therefore, were entitled to assert claims to
a severed mineral interest. In M&H Partnership v. Hines,118 the court
interpreted the term “holder” to include the heirs and devisees of the record
owner of the severed mineral interest that succeed to the severed mineral
interest by intestacy or devise. In a follow-up decision, Warner v.
Palmer,119 the same court further clarified that a “holder” includes heirs of
the record holder of a severed mineral interest, even if such heirs did not
acquire their interest through a chain of title of conveyances or probate
estates that specifically transmitted the mineral interest.
Finally, in Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C.,120 the court
concluded, as a matter of first impression, that Ohio state courts would
adopt the “at the well” rule regarding the deduction of post-production
costs. In Lutz, the plaintiff-lessors had filed a class action complaint,
alleging the lessee underpaid gas royalties under the terms of their oil and
gas leases by allocating to the lessors their share of post-production costs
when calculating royalties. One of the lease forms at issue contained “at the
well” royalty language, which the lessee argued permitted the deduction of
post-production costs from the downstream sales price of natural gas to
work back to the price of the gas “at the well” when calculating royalties.
The lessors, however, urged the court to adopt the “marketable product
rule,” (specifically, West Virginia’s formulation of the rule) which may
118. No. 14 HA 0004, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 921, at *37 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 13,
2017).
119. No. 14 BE 0038, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 1047, at *25 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 22,
2017).
120. No. 4:09-cv-2256, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176898, at *20 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 25,
2017).
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require that certain downstream costs, such as costs for compression,
dehydration, processing, and transportation of gas, be borne solely by the
lessee. In April 2015, the district court certified the question of whether
Ohio follows the “at the well” rule or the marketable product rule to the
Ohio Supreme Court. Although the court accepted the certified question, it
ultimately declined to answer it, concluding that oil and gas leases are
contracts and the “the rights and remedies of the parties are controlled by
the specific language of their lease agreement[.]”121
Back at the district court, the lessee then filed a motion for partial
summary judgment as to the “at the well” lease form, which the district
court granted. Holding that the “at the well” language in the lease was clear
and unambiguous, the district court found that it referred to the “location at
which the gas is valued for purposes of calculating a lessor’s royalties”—
i.e., at the well.122 Conversely, applying the marketable product rule, as
urged by the plaintiffs, “runs the risk of giving the lessor the benefit of a
bargain not made.”123
B. Administrative Developments
In the summer of 2017, the Division issued revised guidelines for
statutory unitization applications.124 Among other things, the guidelines
now provide for a Division review of applications on a rolling basis and
require that applications include pre-filed testimonies by a geologist,
engineer, and landman, as well as six specific exhibits, including one that
lists properties within the proposed unit subject to pending ownership
litigation.
IX. Oklahoma
A. Judicial Developments
In Kamo Electric Cooperative v. Nichols,125 Kamo appealed a judgment
awarding the landowners $30,715 for an easement across 3.9 acres of rural
land used primarily for cattle. The parties were in agreement that the price
for the outright sale of fee simple title to similar agricultural land was
121. 71 N.E.3d 1010, 1011 (Ohio 2016).
122. Lutz, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176898 at *18.
123. Id. (citation omitted).
124. OHIO DEP’T NATURAL RES., DIVISION OF OIL AND GAS RES. MGMT., Unitization
Application Procedural Guideline (Aug. 4, 2017), available at http://oilandgas.ohiodnr.gov/
portals/oilgas/pdf/unitization/UnitizationApplicationGuidelines8_17.pdf.
125. 2017 OK CIV APP 60, 406 P.3d 36.
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$2,000 per acre. However, the expert appraiser for the landowners testified
that “the 3.9 acres taken was worth approximately $8,000 per acre based on
the negotiated acquisition price of similar easements by public utilities in
the area.”126 The jury returned a verdict for $30,615 (approximately $7,800
per acre). Kamo appealed. The court of appeals concluded that a transaction
involving the purchase of an easement on property that will be taken by
condemnation, if negotiations are not successful, is not a transaction
between a willing seller and willing buyer without compulsion and does not
reflect the market value of the property taken. As a consequence, such
transactions are generally inadmissible as comparable sales to show the
value of similar property in a condemnation proceeding. The court reversed
and remanded.
The case of Strack v. Continental Resources, Inc.127 was filed on
November 4, 2010, with the plaintiff mineral owners asking the district
court to certify a class of royalty owners with respect to claims of alleged
royalty underpayments, insufficient reporting and failure to receive the best
price by the defendant. On January 12, 2015, Strack filed an amended
motion to certify class, seeking a “hybrid, issue class action under 12 O.S.
2011 and Supp. 2013, § 2013(B)(1) and/or (B)(2) and § 2023(C)(6)(a).”128
More specifically, in the words of the court, plaintiffs sought certification
with respect to approximately 48 legal issues. In objecting to this approach
to class certification, the defendant complained that no Oklahoma court had
ever certified a hybrid or issue class, and that the plaintiffs were essentially
seeking 48 advisory opinions on issues that did not resolve the underlying
claims, on issues unrelated to numerous prospective class members. The
district court granted Strack’s motion to certify class. The court of appeals
reversed, observing at the outset of its decision that this is an issue of first
impression in Oklahoma, as no Oklahoma court has granted a hybrid class
action or applied Section 2023(C)(6)(a) to maintain a class action with
respect to particular issues. In a lengthy opinion, the court of appeals
concluded that the requirements for class certification under Section 2023
were not met and it reversed the class certification order of the district
court.
The Strack decision is one of at least four court of appeals royalty law
decisions recognizing that the Oklahoma Supreme Court has never
provided a definition of the critical term “marketable product,” as used in
126. Id. at ¶ 2.
127. 2017 OK CIV APP 53, 405 P.3d 131.
128. Id. at ¶ 4.
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its landmark 1998 Mittelstaedt129 decision.130 Mittelstaedt addresses
circumstances in which oil and gas lessees may include in the computation
of royalty payments a proportionate share of certain post-production costs.
Consequently, oil and gas producers, royalty owners and the lower
Oklahoma courts have no clear guidance as to what is required for gas to be
considered a “marketable product” under Mittelstaedt.
In contrast to the outcome in Strack, the case of Naylor Farms, Inc. v.
Chaparral Energy, LLC,131 resulted in an order granting certification of a
limited class. Naylor Farms brought a putative class action suit on behalf of
royalty owners in certain Oklahoma wells seeking to recover for the alleged
underpayment of royalties by Chaparral. The court described the lawsuit as
“similar to several other lawsuits filed by royalty owners claiming that well
operators (or non-operators which marketed the gas) have underpaid
royalties in violation of Oklahoma law by improperly deducting certain
costs incurred in making the gas marketable.”132 In commenting on how
courts have previously denied class certification in certain cases where a
remarkable variety of royalty provisions were presented in the case, the
court observed there were “several distinctions between this case and those
in which classes were not certified or in which the certification orders were
vacated.”133 After substantial further discussion of the particular attributes
perceived to be present in the Naylor Farms case, the court granted class
certification, but excluded the fraud claims from the class and limited the
certification order to a specified type of oil and gas lease. On June 7, 2017,
the Tenth Circuit granted Chaparral’s petition for permission to appeal

129. Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d 1203.
130. Strack v. Continental Res., Inc., 2017 OK CIV APP 53, 405 P.3d 131, at ¶ 31;
Tipton Home, Trustee v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Company, L.P., (Okla. App. 2015 – No.
111,735, November 24, 2015) (Not for Publication) (“The question of where and when
particular gas is marketable is not settled in Oklahoma.”). See page 20 of the opinion in
Tipton; Fitzgerald v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., (Okla. App. 2014 – No. 111,566, February
14, 2014) (Not for Publication) (“The question of where and when particular gas is
marketable is not settled in Oklahoma.”). See page 8 of the opinion in Fitzgerald. A like
observation was made in the January 5, 2018 decision (still pending on efforts at further
review at the time of the submission of this paper) in Pummill v. Hancock Exploration, LLC,
No. 114,703, Before the Oklahoma Court of Appeals.
131. 2017 WL 187542 (W.D. Okla. 2017).
132. Id. at *1.
133. Id. at *4.
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under Fed. R. App. P. 5 and Fed R. Civ. P. 23(f).134 The case remained on
appeal at the time this paper was submitted for publication.
In Blair v. Natural Gas Anadarko Co.,135 the plaintiff mineral owners
(Blair) contended that, following three specific 90-day spans of time, the
well did not cumulatively produce in paying quantities. Blair argued that,
during the three 90-day periods, the total lifting costs at the end of those
periods exceeded the value of the oil sold, causing the cessation of
production clause to terminate the lease. The court of appeals found the
case of Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.,136 to be dispositive, and further
found that the trial court erred in concluding that production had ceased
during the 90-day time periods relied upon by Blair. The court found that
the well’ demonstrated production “capability” caused the lease to continue
under the habendum clause, even though defendants did not “market”
production at certain times. The court observed that the cessation of
production clause did not spring into operation because the well was
capable of production in commercial quantities at all times, and remanded
the case with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of the
defendants.
The case of Newkumet Exploration v. Saxet Corp.137 involved oil and gas
leases of Newkumet burdened by an overriding royalty interest held by
Saxet. Nekumet released the leases because of alleged issues concerning the
validity of the leases and uncertainties as to ownership. Newkumet acquired
new leases and took the position that Saxet’s overriding royalty interest
terminated by its terms when the original leases were released. Saxet
asserted that there was no justification for the release and that Newkumet
released the leases to extinguish Saxet’s override. The trial court entered
summary judgment in favor of Newkumet. Saxet appealed. The court of
appeals reviewed its prior decision in Olson v. Continental Resources,
Inc.138 The court observed that, as in Olson, it was undisputed here that the
original leases contained a specific provision allowing the lessee to
surrender and release the leases at any time. Additionally, the assignment of
overriding royalty interest in favor of Saxet did not contain a provision
stating that the override applied to extensions and renewals of the original
leases. The court noted that the assignment of an overriding royalty interest
134. Order filed June 7, 2017, Chaparral Energy LLC v. Naylor Farms Inc., No. 17-601,
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
135. .2017 OK CIV APP 57, 406 P.3d 580.
136. 1994 OK 23, 869 P.2d 323.
137. 87 OBJ 2673 (Okla. App. 2016 - #114,794) (Not for publication).
138. 2005 OK CIV APP 13, 109 P.3d 351, cert. denied.
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does not, by itself, create a fiduciary relationship between assignor and
assignee. However, such a relationship may arise from other factors. The
court concluded that there were no facts supporting the existence of a
fiduciary relationship between Saxet and Newkumet which might have
prevented the termination of the override. The court affirmed the trial
court’s decision in favor of Newkumet.
The case of Max Oil Company Inc. v. Range Production Company
LLC,139 involved a suit by the plaintiff owners of certain producing oil and
gas wells against Range. The plaintiffs alleged that Range’s oil and gas
hydraulic fracture operations permanently damaged their nearby producing
oil and gas wells. The plaintiffs sued Range alleging negligence, trespass,
nuisance and conversion. Range filed a motion to dismiss asserting, in part,
that the plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred under the two-year statute of
limitations under OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 95(3) (2017). The
arguments on appeal were limited to the claims of trespass and nuisance.
However, after reviewing the alleged facts the plaintiffs knew and the dates
on which the plaintiffs knew them, both the district court and the 10th
Circuit concluded that their suit was filed beyond the two-year limitations
period.
In Stephens Production Co. v. Tripco, Inc.,140 the issue before the court
was whether the statutory Pugh clause in OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52 §
87.1(b) (2017) applies to a secondary recovery unit formed under the
Unitization Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52 § 287.1, et seq. (2017). The
answer to that question, in the context of the present case, would determine
which oil and gas leases were in effect as to the unitized field at issue in this
case. Specifically, Stephens argued that the statutory Pugh clause had
operated to extinguish Tripco’s lease as to right outside a specified tract.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Tripco. Stephens
appealed. In its review of the pertinent statutes, the court of appeals
emphasized the repeated references in the statutory Pugh clause to “spacing
units” created under Section 87.1. The court of appeals agreed that the Pugh
clause in § 87.1 does not apply to the field-wide enhanced recovery units
created by the Unitization Act of 52 O.S. § 287.1, et seq.” The court of
appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, found that the statutory
Pugh clause did not apply in this case, and that the Tripco lease was valid as
a result of being held by production from the secondary recovery unit
formed under OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52 § 287.1, et seq. (2017).
139. 2017 WL 972083 (10th Cir. 2017) (applying Oklahoma substantive law).
140. 2016 OK CIV APP 80, 389 P.3d 365.
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The court in Bebout v. Ewell,141 was presented with an attempt to set
aside a district court order entered some 32 years earlier distributing assets
in the probate of an estate. Two grandsons of the decedent alleged that the
final order in the estate was void on the face of the judgment roll and
sought to quiet title to certain mineral interests in the grandsons. The
district court found that the final order was void for lack of required notice
to the grandsons. The court of appeals affirmed. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court granted certiorari. The grandsons contended that, in probate
proceedings, a failure to send copies of the final account to known heirs or
beneficiaries, providing notice of the personal representative’s adverse
demands upon the estate, violated due process. However, the court found
that the wording in the notice sent to the grandsons was sufficient. It
informed them of the date, time, and place of the hearing, and apprised the
grandsons that their grandfather's estate was to be settled at the hearing and
that all persons interested had to appear to dispute the proposed distribution.
Critically, the notice informed the grandsons that the final account and
petition with will annexed were on file with the court and that the account
would be settled and allowed, putting the Grandsons on further inquiry
notice. Had they investigated the matter by either inspecting the documents
in the court file or attending the hearing, they could have easily ascertained
that the entire estate was to be distributed to others and that nothing was to
be left to either of them. The final order was not void for lack of proper
notice.
In Vance v. Enogex Gas Gathering, L.L.C.,142 Enogex appealed the trial
court’s judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff-landowners in a
suit alleging oil field pipeline leakage and pollution. Enogex witnesses
testified at trial that they repaired a pinhole leak in the pipeline and did not
hear any complaints from the landowners until two years later when the
lawsuit was filed. Enogex’s expert testified that he then investigated the
claim and again found no groundwater pollution and only a very small
amount of soil contamination. The landowners presented certain evidence
in support of their claims and requested damages in the amount of
$400,000.00 for diminution in the value of their property and punitive
damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the landowners for
$25,000.00 in damage to the property, but awarded no damages on
landowners’ claims for personal inconvenience, annoyance and discomfort.
The jury also found clear and convincing evidence that Enogex acted in
141. 2017 OK 22, 392 P.3d 699.
142. 2017 OK CIV APP 14, 393 P.3d 718.
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reckless disregard of the rights of the landowners and returned a verdict for
$25,000.00 in punitive damages. Enogex appealed the judgment only as to
the award of punitive damages and did not challenge the $25,000.00
compensatory award. After reviewing the aspects of the trial court’s rulings
that were complained of on appeal in detail, the court affirmed the
judgment below.
In Stephens Production Co. v. Larsen,143 Stephens filed a condemnation
action against the defendant landowners under Oklahoma’s underground
gas storage statutes that provide certain condemnation rights. Stephens
sought to condemn underground gas storage easements and surface
easements to complete a natural gas storage facility on and underneath
some 900 acres of property. Approximately 140 defendants were originally
named in Stephens’ petition. Upon issuance of the report of the
commissioners, all defendants except Larsen settled with Stephens. Larsen
owned an 80-acre tract within the 900-acre area. The commissioners valued
Larsen’s property that would be taken, and the damage to the remainder of
his lands, as being $12,400.00. The case proceeded to a non-jury trial.
Larsen’s expert witness testified that $419,000.00 would be just
compensation to Larsen. Stephens’ expert testified that $9,000.00 would be
just compensation. The trial court determined that $9,000.00 represented
just compensation. Larsen appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted Larsen’s petition
for certiorari. The court noted that Larsen’s expert’s valuation of
$419,000—which constituted more than eight times the fee simple value of
the entire 80-acre parcel—was premised on the value of the property upon
the completion and operation of an underground gas storage facility. Yet,
the evidence at trial indicated that there was no active market for
underground storage in the area at issue in this case. The court affirmed the
district court’s valuation of $9,000.00, stating in part:
[W]ithout any evidence from Mr. Larsen regarding the
reasonable probability of combination or the market demand for
underground gas storage in the area, the highest and best use of
the property was the use to which it was subject at the time of
the taking--natural resource, agricultural, and recreational use.
The record supports the trial court's valuation of just
compensation at $9,000.00.144

143. 2017 OK 36, 394 P.3d 1262.
144. Id. ¶ 21.
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The court further observed that the law does not permit the court to fix
speculative, boom or fancy values on condemned property.
The case of Sierra Club v. Chesapeake Operating, LLC,145 involved a
lawsuit by the Sierra Club for declaratory and injunctive relief under the
citizen suit provision of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, amended as the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.146 The plaintiff alleged in its
complaint that that the deep injection of liquid waste from oil and gas
extraction activities by defendants . . . has contributed, and continues to
contribute, to an increase in earthquakes throughout the State of Oklahoma
and in southern Kansas.”147 The defendants filed multiple motions to
dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The
defendants asserted multiple grounds for their motions including abstention
and primary jurisdiction doctrines, and plaintiff’s failure to join in the suit
every company disposing of liquid wastes from oil and gas extraction
activities into injection wells. After a lengthy discussion of certain of the
underlying facts and applicable law, the court granted the motions to
dismiss under the Burford abstention doctrine and the primary jurisdiction
doctrine. The substantial work of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission
in addressing the earthquake-related issues asserted in the complaint was
described in detail in the court’s ruling.
B. Administrative Developments
Documents filed in the rulemakings referred to below can be viewed on
the Oklahoma Corporation Commission’s (Commission's) website at
www.occeweb.com.
Amendments to Title 165, Chapter 10 of the Oklahoma Administrative
Code (OAC), which comprises the Commission’s Oil & Gas Conservation
Rules, were addressed in Cause RM No. 201600019. Following is a brief
summary of certain of the amendments which became effective on
September 11, 2017:
OAC 165:10-1-4 was amended to update the list of effective dates for
OAC 165:10 rulemakings; OAC 165:10-1-7 to update the list of Oil and
Gas Conservation Division prescribed forms and to add new forms; OAC
165:10-3-10 regarding the use of diesel fuel as the base fluid for hydraulic
fracturing operations and reporting of impacts of hydraulic fracturing
operations on other wells; OAC 165:10-3-25 concerning Completion
145. 2017 WL 1287546 (W.D. Okla. 2017).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 6901, et seq., specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
147. Id. at *1.
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Reports and amended Completion Reports; OAC 165:10-5-5 with respect to
applications for approval of enhanced recovery injection and disposal
operations; OAC 165:10-5-6 regarding testing and monitoring requirements
for enhanced recovery injection wells and disposal wells; OAC 165:10-5-7
concerning monitoring and reporting requirements for enhanced recovery
injection wells, disposal wells and storage wells, and to include a reference
to OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 52 and provisions appearing therein; OAC
165:10-5-10 with respect to transfer of authority to inject concerning
underground injection wells; OAC 165:10-5-15 regarding reporting
requirements for simultaneous injection wells, and OAC 165:10-7-19 was
amended concerning land application of water-based fluids from earthen
pits, tanks and pipeline construction.
OAC 165:10-7-26 was amended with respect to land application of
contaminated soils and petroleum hydrocarbon-based drill cuttings; OAC
165:10-9-1 concerning use of commercial pits; OAC 165:10-9-3 regarding
commercial disposal well surface facilities; OAC 165:10-11-3 with respect
to plugging of wells; OAC 165:10-11-6 regarding plugging and plugging
back procedures for wells.
An emergency rulemaking was filed in Cause RM No. 201700009
regarding OAC 165:10-3-28. Amendments to the rule were needed on an
emergency basis so that the Commission’s Oil and Gas Conservation rules
set forth in the Oklahoma Administrative Code (OAC) 165:10 would
conform to provisions in Senate Bill No. 867-the Oklahoma Energy Jobs
Act of 2017-which became effective August 25, 2017. The proposed
changes to OAC 165:10 were to address changes to OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit.52 § 87.1 and OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.52 §§ 87.1 and 87.6 through 87.9.
The changes include the addition of definitions for new terms, deletion of
definitions for other terms, and adding references to 1,280-acre horizontal
well units.
Amendments to Title 165, Chapter 5 of the Oklahoma Administrative
Code, which comprises the Commission’s Rules of Practice, were
addressed in Cause RM No. 201700001. Following is a brief summary of
certain of the amendments which became effective on September 11, 2017:
OAC 165:5-1-3 was amended concerning definitions; OAC 165:5-1-4
with respect to filings with the Court Clerk; OAC 165:5-1-5 regarding
filing of documents; OAC 165:5-1-9 concerning telephonic and
videoconferencing testimony; OAC 165:5-1-26 concerning receipt of
pollution complaints; OAC 165:5-1-27 with respect to review of pollution
complaints; OAC 165:5-1-28 regarding closure of pollution complaints;
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OAC 165:5-1-29 concerning pollution complaint resolution; OAC 165:5-130 with respect to reporting of pollution complaints.
OAC 165:5-5-1 was amended regarding dockets; OAC 165:5-7-1 with
respect to application and notice requirements; OAC 165:5-7-15 is revoked
regarding tertiary crude oil recovery project certification; OAC 165:5-7-30
was amended with respect to amendment of existing orders or permits
authorizing injection for enhanced recovery, saltwater disposal or LPG
storage wells; OAC 165:5-7-60 concerning reciprocity of final orders
between states with respect to electric companies; OAC 165:5-21-3.1 is a
new rule regarding applications to permanently close underground storage
tanks in place; Appendix J concerning a witness identification form was
revoked and a new Appendix J promulgated with respect to a witness
identification form for presentation of testimony by telephone or
videoconferencing connection.
An emergency rulemaking was filed in Cause RM No. 201700008
regarding OAC 165:5-7-6, OAC 165:5-7-6.1, OAC 165:5-7-6.2 and OAC
165:5-7-7. Amendments to the rules were needed on an emergency basis so
that the Commission’s Rules of Practice set forth in the Oklahoma
Administrative Code (OAC) 165:5 would conform to provisions in Senate
Bill No. 867-the Oklahoma Energy Jobs Act of 2017-which became
effective August 25, 2017. The proposed changes to OAC 165:5 were to
address changes to OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.52 § 87.1 and OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit.52 §§ 87.1 and 87.6 through 87.9. The changes include modification of
terms regarding applications requesting the issuance of orders concerning
horizontal well unitizations and multiunit horizontal wells in targeted
reservoirs, addressing authorizations for expenditure regarding applications
for pooling orders, as well as requirements for horizontal spacing units.
X. Pennsylvania
A. Legislative Developments
The House of Representatives passed House Bill 674,148 the fiscal code
bill for 2017, on October 24, 2017. The bill was presented to Governor
Wolf on October 25, 2017 and approved by the Governor on October 30,
2017. Section 1610-E of the bill, entitled “Temporary Cessation of Oil and
Gas Wells,” establishes that a lessor shall be deemed to acknowledge that a
period of nonproduction under an oil and gas lease is a temporary cessation
insufficient to terminate the lease, and the lessor may not allege that the
148. https://legiscan.com/PA/bill/HB674/2017.
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lease is terminated if either of the following occur: (1) before the lessor
claims that the lease has expired, the lessee restarts production from the
lease and the lessor accepts a royalty payment; or (2) the lessee drills a new
well on the lease after giving the lessor 90 days to object.
On March 21, 2017, Governor Wolf announced that the Department of
Environmental Protection launched an e-submissions public review tool to
allow the public to more quickly and easily view documents submitted by
unconventional oil and gas operators.149 The public review tool enables
citizens to search for documents by various parameters, including well site
and operator, and houses documents including well development impound
registrations, well completion reports, and post-drilling site restoration
reports.
B. Judicial Developments
On October 8, 2016, the Environmental Quality Board passed final
rulemaking on regulations related to surface activities associated with the
development of unconventional oil and gas wells, which amended Chapter
78 (relating to oil and gas wells) and added Chapter 78a (relating to
unconventional wells).150 Prior to this final rulemaking, the surface activity
requirements in Chapter 78 had not been updated since 2001.
The rules set performance standards governing surface activities
associated with the development of unconventional well sites. For example,
Section 78a.68a requires pipeline operators conducting horizontal
directional drilling beneath a body of water or a watercourse to notify the
DEP at least 24 hours before beginning said drilling. The rules also
implement more stringent requirements for the storing of wastewater at
impoundments, and in large part prohibit any disposal of drill cuttings at
well sites. Section 78a.56 prohibits the use of pits for temporary storage on
unconventional well sites, and Section 78a.59a establishes requirements for
impoundment embankments. Section 78a.59b sets requirements for
registration of new and existing well development impoundments,
including standards for the location and construction of well development
impoundments.
The court enjoined certain provisions of the Chapter 78a regulations on
November 8, 2016.151 First, the court enjoined portions of certain provisions
149. https://www.governor.pa.gov/governor-wolf-announces-launch-of-oil-and-gaselectronic-submissions-review-for-accelerated-public-access/.
150. 25 PA. CODE Chs. 78,78a; see also 46 PA. BULL. 6431 (Oct. 8, 2016).
151. See Marcellus Shale Coal. v. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., No. 573 MD 2016, 2016 Pa.
Commw. (Unpublished), LEXIS 830, (Pa. Commw. Ct. Nov. 8, 2016).
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that mandated that unconventional operators must provide certain
information to listed public resource agencies within a specified distance of
a proposed well, including a plat and proposed measures to mitigate
potential damage to public resources. The court also enjoined Chapter 78a
provisions that required unconventional operators to identify and monitor
and possibly remediate active, inactive, orphan, abandoned, or plugged
wells under certain conditions. The court held that these requirements were
problematic because a well operator could be required to monitor and even
plug wells that may be inaccessible to the operator or off-lease. The court
also enjoined the imposition of new construction standards for existing
impoundments that were built pursuant to permits and the DEP’s view of
the law at the time, finding that if these provisions were not enjoined, the
Marcellus Shale Coalition would be unable to recover hundreds of
thousands to millions of dollars to retrofit existing impoundments.
Finally, the court enjoined the provisions of Chapter 78a regarding well
site restoration standards and found that there was a legal question as to
whether the new well site restoration standards impose requirements in
excess of what is required by the Clean Stream Laws. Currently, Act 13
provides that erosion and sediment control regulations must comply with
the Clean Streams Law, and the court was persuaded that there was a
substantial legal question as to whether Section 78a.65(d) abrogates any
requirements or exemptions in the Clean Streams Law. The DEP has
appealed the court’s injunction to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.152
The Commonwealth Court issued a published opinion interpreting the
impact fee provision in Act 13.153 In Snyder Bros. v. Pa. Public Utility
Commission, the issue on appeal was the statutory interpretation of the
definition of “stripper well” in Act 13, which is not required to pay impact
fees. The court was tasked with determining whether the General Assembly
intended the word “any” to mean “one” or “every.” The court held that the
phrase “any” meant “any” or “one” and not “all” or “every” based on the
plain language of Act 13, thus a stripper well is not required to pay an
impact fee if it is a well that produces less than 90,000 cubic feet of gas in
at least one month. On October 18, 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
granted the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s petition for
allowance of appeal.154
152. See Marcellus Shale Coal. v. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., No. 115 MAP 2016.
153. Snyder Bros. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 157 A.3d 1018 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017).
154. Snyder Bros. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, No. 166, WAL 2017, 2017 WL 4680121
(Oct. 18, 2017).
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Federal courts in Pennsylvania have been wrestling with the question of
arbitrability in royalty class action disputes involving oil and gas leases
with arbitration provisions. In Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Scout
Petroleum LLC,155 the court held that courts, and not arbitrators, decide
questions of class arbitrability absent clear and unmistakable evidence
otherwise.156 Following the decision by the Third Circuit in Scout I, the trial
court judge was tasked with resolving the second issue raised in the
complaint, which involved whether the contracts permitted class arbitration,
or whether only individual or bilateral arbitration was permitted.157 The
court noted that in Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Ostroski,158 the court
had held that class arbitration was not permitted in a similar lease provision,
which provided that, in the event of a disagreement between lessor and
lessee concerning the lease, the resolution of all such disputes would be
determined in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration
Association. The district court judge adopted the reasoning in Ostroski and
held that the leases only permitted individual or bilateral arbitration rather
than class arbitration. Scout Petroleum filed an appeal to the Third Circuit
on May 9, 2017.159
In Valley Rod & Gun Club v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C.,
Chesapeake constructed a natural gas well pursuant to an oil and gas lease
which granted Chesapeake “such exclusive rights as may be necessary or
convenient for Lessee, at its election, to explore for, develop, produce,
measure and market production from the premises....”160 The oil and gas
was severed from the surface of the property, and the surface owners filed
suit alleging misappropriation and conversion of the rock, fill, mulch, and
other surface material that Chesapeake used to build a well pad on its
property. The district court granted summary judgment to Chesapeake,
155. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Scout Petroleum LLC, 809 F.3d 746 (3d Cir.
2016) (“Scout I”).
156. See also Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Brown, 2016 WL 815571 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 2, 2016); Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Ostroski, 199 F. Supp. 3d 912 (M.D. Pa.
2016) (granting a motion for summary judgment filed by Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C.
declaring that the lease at issue did not permit class arbitration, agreeing with Chesapeake
that because the lease was silent on the issue of class arbitration, it was not permissible).
157. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Scout Petroleum LLC, 2017 WL 1541659, *1
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2017).
158. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Ostroski, 2016 WL 4179583 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8,
2016).
159. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Scout Petroleum LLC, No. 17-2037 (3d Cir.).
160. Valley Rod & Gun Club v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 2017 WL 1173930
(M.D. Pa. March 29, 2017).
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finding that both the lease and Pennsylvania law allow for a lessee to use as
much of the surface property as is “reasonably necessary” to extract the oil
and gas. Because Chesapeake is the exclusive owner of the oil and gas
underlying the property, Chesapeake has the right to use as much of the
surface as is reasonably necessary to develop and produce the gas
underlying the surface tract. Valley Rod filed an appeal to the Third Circuit
on May 1, 2017.161 The appeal was dismissed on September 8, 2017.162
In Cardinale v. R.E. Gas Development, LLC, plaintiffs brought a breach
of contract class action alleging that the defendants failed to pay pre-paid
rental or bonus payments under leases purportedly executed with the
plaintiffs.163 The leases were substantially identical in all material respects
except for the name of the lessor, the description of the leased area, and the
amount of payment because the amount depended on the acreage covered
by the lease. The leases provided that payment was supposed to occur
within 60 days of the receipt of the executed lease and order for payment.
The defendants’ obligation to pay the bonus payments was subject only to
its inspection, approval of the surface, geology and title of the leased
premises. The court found that class certification was proper because there
common questions predominated over individual questions, including: (1)
whether the defendants entered into a contract with each class member; (2)
at what point the contract was executed; (3) when the defendants were
obligated to pay the bonus payments to class members; (4) whether
defendants’ obligation to pay the bonus payments was contingent only upon
the three reasons stated in the contract; (5) whether the bonus payments
absolute at the expiration of the 60 days; and (6) whether the 60 days ran by
calendar days or banking days.
In EQT Production Company v. Borough of Jefferson Hills, the Borough
of Jefferson Hills appealed a trial court decision reversing the Borough
Council’s denial of a conditional use application by EQT Production
Company (EQT) to construct and operate a natural gas production facility.
The Council denied the application on the basis that EQT had failed to
satisfy a zoning ordinance which provided that the use shall not endanger
the public health, safety or welfare nor deteriorate the environment, as a
result of being located on the property where it is proposed. The trial court
reversed the Council’s decision, and the Council appealed. The
161. Valley Rod & Gun Club v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., No. 17-1951 (3d Cir.).
162. Valley Rod & Gun Club v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 2017 WL 5256217 (3d
Cir. Sept. 8, 2017).
163. Cardinale v. R.E. Gas Dev., LLC, 154 A.3d 1275 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
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Commonwealth Court held EQT had successfully established compliance
with specific requirements of the ordinance, and that the burden shifted to
the Borough to prove that there was a high degree of probability that the
conditional use will constitute a detriment to the public health, safety, and
welfare exceeding that ordinarily to be expected from the proposed use. The
court concluded that the Borough did not meet its burden because the
evidence provided by the Borough was speculative, and the lay and expert
testimony was not specific to the site proposal at issue. The court concluded
that “given the fact that there has been a legislative decision that the
particular use is presumptively consistent with the health, safety, and
welfare of the community”, the Borough’s testimony was insufficient to
satisfy its burden.164
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a landmark decision165
addressing the issue of whether certain statutory enactments related to funds
generated from the leasing of forest and park lands owned by the
Commonwealth for oil and gas exploration and extraction were
constitutional under Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
known as the Environmental Rights Amendment.166 The Pennsylvania
Environmental Defense Foundation (PEDF) filed a declaratory judgment
action against the Commonwealth challenging budget-related decisions
from 2009 to 2015 related to leasing lands owned by the Commonwealth
for oil and gas development and the use of the monies in the Oil and Gas
Lease Fund, and whether these actions violated the Amendment.167 On
appeal, the court held that the proper standard of review was described in
the text of the Amendment as based on the underlying principles of
Pennsylvania trust law in effect at the time of its enactment. The court
noted that the Amendment granted two rights to the people of the
Commonwealth: 1) the right to clean air, water, and the preservation of
natural values of the environment, and 2) a public trust pursuant to which
natural resources are the corpus of the trust, the Commonwealth the trustee,
and the people the named beneficiaries. The court concluded that because
the Amendment creates a trust, the proceeds that the Commonwealth
generates by selling its oil and gas reserves remain in the corpus of the
trust. Second, the court determined that the assets of the trust should be
used for conversation and maintenance purposes because the Amendment
164.
2017).
165.
166.
167.

EQT Prod. Co. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills, 162 A.3d 554 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth., 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017).
PA. CONST., art. I, § 27.
Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth., 108 A.3d 140 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015).
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provided that the trust should be used for the benefit of all of the people.
Thus, the court held that the statutes at issue that diverted oil and gas sale
proceeds to programs other than those for conserving and maintaining
public natural resources were unconstitutional.
XI. Texas
A. Judicial Developments
In Wenske v. Ealy,168 a divided 5-4 decision, the Texas Supreme Court
analyzed the difference between the language “a reservation from” and an
“exception to” in a conveyance of minerals. The Wenskes bought a 55 acre
mineral estate. The two grantors each reserved a 1/8th NPRI for a period of
25 years, resulting in a combined one-fourth NPRI over all the oil, gas and
other minerals produced from the property. Subsequently, the Wenskes sold
the property to the Ealys by Warranty Deed. After reviewing lengthy
provisions in the deed providing for new reservations to the Wenskes and
referring to the prio reservations, the trial court granted summary judgment
that the Ealys and Wenskes must share the NPRI’s burden in proportion to
their interests. Noting that neither party argued that the deed was
ambiguous, the Texas Supreme Court agreed and proceeded to review the
intent expressed in the wording of the deed. The court held that there was
not a clear expression of intent that the Ealys interest should be the sole
interest subject to the NPRI, and that the parties should share the NPRI
burden in proportion to each of their interests. The practical result of this
holding is to avoid an unintended result where the buyer exclusively bears
the NPRI. The Court further noted that it did not hold that all conveyances
of a fractional mineral interest subject to an NPRI will result automatically
in the various fractional interest owners being responsible for paying an
NPRI.
In Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Barrow-Shaver Res. Co.,169 a farmout
agreement provided that the rights granted to a party may not be assigned,
subleased or otherwise transferred in whole or in part, without the express
written consent of the granting party. The court held that the contract
allowed the granting party to withhold consent and that it had no obligation
to act reasonably. In making its determination, the court found persuasive
evidence showing that in the course of negotiations of the contract,

168. 521 S.W. 3d 791 (Tex. 2017).
169. 516 S.W.3d 89, pet. filed, (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017).
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qualifying language providing that consent could not be unreasonably
withheld was deleted from the contract.
The court in Greer v. Shook170 construed a 1927 deed that basically
conveyed an undivided one-sixteenth interest in and to all oil, gas, and other
minerals that may be produced, but then added that the grantee was
purchasing one-half of the royalty, one-half of the minerals produced. The
deed also provided that the sale covered and included one- half of all the oil
and gas royalty due and to be paid under a then-existing lease. The issue on
appeal was whether this language conveyed a floating one-half royalty
interest or a fixed one-sixteenth royalty. The court applied the estate
misconception doctrine to harmonize the conveyance’s inconsistent
fractions, finding that the grantor used “1/16” as a shorthand for one-half of
what he believed to be his remaining one-eighth mineral interest. The court
therefore held that the deed unambiguously conveyed a floating one-half
royalty, noting that there was nothing in the deed to indicate that grantor
intended to convey a one-half royalty under the existing lease which would
result in a substantially reduced one-sixteenth royalty under all future
leases.
Reed v. Maltsberger/Storey Ranch, LLC171 resolved contradictory
language in a deed. A 1942 deed said it conveyed an undivided one-fourth
interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that
may be produced from certain lands. The deed stated that the described
lands were subject to an existing oil and gas lease. The deed limited certain
rights normally given to mineral-interest owners. Although certain wording
in the deed suggested the conveyance of a royalty interest, the court only
looked at what was stated in the wording of the deed and did not otherwise
consider the grantor’s intentions. Further, the court did not given
controlling weight to the fact that the document was titled “Royalty Deed”.
The court explained that the deed conveyed a mineral interest since it stated
that it conveyed an interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in
and under the described lands.
In BNSF Ry. Co. v. Chevron Midcontinent, L.P.,172 the court considered
whether a deed that contained ambiguous language granted only an
easement or a fee simple interest in the land. The granting clause of the
deed purported to grant an easement by granting a right of way in a certain
strip of land, while the habendum clause contemplated granting an interest
170. 503 S.W.3d 571, pet. filed, (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016).
171. 04-16-00231-CV, 2017 WL 1683717, pet. filed, (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 3,
2017).
172. 528 S.W.3d 124, no pet., (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017).
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in fee simple. The court held that the overall intent of a grantor must be
gleaned from within the four corners of the deed. Following the principle in
Texas Electric Railway,173 the court held that the language in the granting
clause controls. Because the overall language in the deed evidenced an
intent to grant only an easement and the granting clause contemplated a
right of way, while the habendum clause purported to grant a fee simple,
the court upheld the decision that the deed granted to BNSF only an
easement. Thus, BNSF had no rights to the mineral estate. The court did not
reconcile the two grants by holding that there was a grant of an easement in
perpetuity.
In Samson Exploration, LLC v. T.S. Reed Props., Inc.,174 the court
refused to reform the agreement based upon an assertion that the lessee
mistakenly agreed to pay royalties twice by virtue of overlapping pooled
units. A lessee of three wells maintained two pooled units. The second unit
was maintained by the second and third wells. The lessee later amended the
second unit to include only the second well and created a third unit to
encompass the third well. During this process, however, the lessee
mistakenly created the second and third units in a manner that caused the
underlying rights to overlap and subjected the lessee to the duty to pay
royalties on the wells twice—once to those in the second unit and once to
those in the third unit. When the lessee failed to pay the appropriate amount
of royalties, the royalty owners in the units brought suit to recover the
unpaid royalties. Arguing defense of impossibility, the lessee asserted that it
was impossible to cross-convey the same pooled lands, substances and
depths twice at the same time. Rejecting this argument, the court noted that
there was no impediment from enforcement of the royalty obligations
against the lessee, even if there was no effective conveyance of title. The
lessee additionally sought reimbursement from the second unit for any
royalty obligation paid to it that was actually owed to those in the third unit.
Rejecting this request, the court stated that the lessee must bear its
contractual obligation to pay royalties out of its working interest rather than
seeking reimbursement from owners of the second unit as the lessee’s
economic consequences of its actions were of its own making.
In Norhill Energy LLC v. McDaniel,175 an oil and gas lessee brought suit
against its lessor alleging breach of contract and the equitable claim of
money “had and received.” These actions arose out of lessor’s failure to
173. Tex. Elec. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 252 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1952).
174. 521 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. 2017).
175. 517 S.W.3d 910, pet. denied, (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017).
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provide $50,000 to lessee under the lease contract which stipulated that the
subject lease would be assigned back to the lessor at which time the lessor
would pay lessee $50,000. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
lessor, lessee appealed and the court of appeals reversed and rendered. The
appeals court overruled lessee’s breach of contract claim because, although
lessee established the element of breach at trial, it did not demonstrate how
it was entitled to $50,000 in damages for the breach. However, the court did
uphold lessee’s claim for money had and received. Lessor argued that the
claim for money had and received was barred because the express contract
between the parties precluded the claim and the lessee had an adequate
remedy at law. However, the court noted that the Texas Supreme Court has
not ruled on whether an action for money had and received is barred when
the money in dispute is part of a valid contract that would otherwise
provide an adequate remedy at law. Although the court went on to note that
equitable claims are generally barred when there is an express contract
covering the issue, it also noted that the general rule is not absolute. The
court concluded that the facts in this case did not preclude lessee’s claim for
money had and received because it was not inconsistent with the express
agreement.
In Crystal River Oil & Gas, LLC v. Patton,176 the court determined
whether the trial court erred when it limited “reworking operations,” under
an oil and gas lease, to activities on “producing wells.” Crystal River owned
and operated wells on the oil and gas lease in question. The oil wells
produced about twenty barrels of salt water for each barrel of oil they
produced, so Crystal River operated a disposal well on the lease to manage
the salt water production. The disposal well broke down, and while Crystal
River was repairing the well it shut in its oil wells for more than sixty days.
Believing that the lapse in production terminated the lease, Patton obtained
an oil and gas lease covering the same lands. Thereafter, Patton sued
Crystal River to establish his title. Crystal River’s lease provided that, if
production should cease after the primary term, the lease would not
terminate if the lessee commenced additional drilling or reworking
operations within sixty days thereafter. The case was submitted to the jury,
and the jury was given the following questions: Did the Defendants fail to
commence drilling or reworking activities on the producing wells in
question within 60 days after the wells ceased to produce oil and gas? The
jury answered yes, and Crystal River appealed. The court of appeals
reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court erred in restricting
176. 510 S.W.3d 226, no pet., (Tex. App.—Eastland 2016).
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“reworking operations” to activities “on the producing wells”, as such
restriction was not expressly so stated in the Crystal River lease.
In BP America Production Co. v. Laddex, Ltd.,177 top lessee Laddex
brought suit against BP arguing BP’s bottom lease had terminated for
failure to produce in paying quantities. In turn, BP argued that Laddex’s top
lease was void as it violated the Rule Against Perpetuities. Laddex’s top
lease specified that it would commence on (1) the date when written
releases of BP’s bottom lease were filed or (2) the date a judgment
terminating BP’s lease became final and non-appealable. The trial court
determined that the Rule did not void Laddex’s lease, and the jury found
that BP’s lease terminated for failure to produce in paying quantities over a
reasonable time period. The court of appeals affirmed that the Rule did not
invalidate Laddex’s lease, but determined that the jury was improperly
instructed on the production in paying quantities analysis. The Supreme
Court affirmed. In so doing, the court determined that Laddex’s lease
conveyed to it a partial alienation of the lessors’ possibility of reverter
under BP’s bottom lease—an interest that had already vested. Turning to
the jury instruction issue, the court determined that the instruction asking
whether the well at issue produced in paying quantities during a specific 15month time period was error. The court noted that narrowing the question
on paying production to any particular time period was arbitrary. Thus,
although the parties were free to argue their views regarding what would be
a reasonable time period, the charge to the jury may not instruct the jury as
to the time period to consider. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the
intermediate appellate court and remanded the matter for a new trial.
In Hardin Simmons University v. Hunt Cimaron LP,178 the lessor sued
the lessee, claiming the lease terminated at the conclusion of the primary
term because the lessee failed to develop any new wells or convert any
existing wells to producing wells during that term. Evidence showed that
the lessee began reworking operations on ten existing wells prior to the end
of the primary term. The trial court entered a take nothing judgment against
the lessor. On appeal, the appellate court reviewed the lease contract,
specifically the Pugh, retained acreage, reworking, and continuous
development clauses. The court interpreted the reworking clause to mean
the lease only continued with respect to the ten existing wells being
reworked and the retained acreage associated with those wells. The court’s
decision turned on the difference in language between the continuous
177. 513 S.W.3d 476 (Tex. 2017).
178. 07-15-00303-CV, 2017 WL 3197920, no pet., (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 25, 2017).
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development and reworking provisions. The continuous development clause
kept the lease in effect regarding all lands and all depths whereas the
reworking clause only continued the lease in accordance to its terms. The
court ruled that because of the language referring to the terms of the lease,
the reworking clause incorporated the Pugh and retained acreage clauses.
The result was the termination of the lease with respect to the land not
producing or being reworked. However, the lease remained in effect as to
the ten wells being reworked and 40 acres around each of those wells.
In Westlake Ethylene Pipeline Corp. v. Railroad Commission of Texas,179
the court ruled on the enforceability of the tariff of Westlake Ethylene
Pipeline Corporation, a common carrier and the owner and operator of a
pipeline that solely transports liquified ethylene and runs between Mont
Belvieu and Longview, Texas. In 2013, Eastman Chemical Company filed
a complaint with the Railroad Commission, asserting that Westlake’s tariff
was discriminatory, and therefore unenforceable. The tariff canceled two
services that were previously offered by Westlake—backhaul services and
exchange services. To backhaul is to cause the flow of product in the
opposite direction from the usual direction of flow. Exchange services refer
to the transfer of custody of a specific quantity or volume of a fungible
product (such as ethylene) from one location to another so that no physical
movement of the product is necessary. Eastman claimed that these
cancellations provided an unreasonable preference to Westlake Longview
Corp., an affiliate of Westlake, because elimination of the backhaul and
exchange services cut off access to the Mont Belvieu market and unduly
required other shippers to conduct business with Westlake Longview Corp.
The issue was initially brought before the Railroad Commission, which
found that the tariff was unenforceable. Westlake challenged that ruling,
and the district court ruled in favor of Eastman. The court of appeals
affirmed the Railroad Commission’s decision, holding that discrimination
includes not only disparate treatment of similarly situated shippers but also
the granting of an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to a
particular shipper. Here, there was a reasonable basis for the Commission’s
finding that the tariff was discriminatory.
In ExxonMobil v. Lazy R Ranch,180 a landowner sought damages and
injunctive relief to remedy a continuing nuisance caused by soil and
groundwater contamination from an oil and gas lease. The Texas Supreme
Court agreed with the trial court that claims concerning two of the four
179. 506 S.W.3d 676, pet. filed, (Tex. App.—Austin 2016).
180. 511 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. 2017).
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contaminated sites were barred by the statute of limitations. As to the other
two sites, active operations were still being conducted when suit was filed.
Consequently, the court found the evidence conflicting as to when the
contamination had occurred and reversed the trial court’s summary
judgment ruling as to those two sites. The court reiterated that the
“discovery rule” does not apply to delay the commencement of the
limitations period when conditions on the ground are objectively verifiable.
Additionally, the court affirmed Texas’ economic feasibility exception to
the measure of damages for contamination of land. However, even though
the court cited with approval prior cases holding that limitations is not a
defense to abate a continuing nuisance, the court declined to address the
plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief. The court found that Exxon Mobil
failed to address the injunctive claims in its original summary judgment
motion, and the plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief evolved over the
course of the case and muddled the issue further.
Lightning Oil Company v. Andarko E&P Onshore, LLC181 involved a
claim against one mineral lessee by an adjoining mineral lessee for tortious
interference with contract and trespass. Lightning sought an injunction and
restraining order to prevent Anadarko from siting a well on the surface of
Lightning’s lease and drilling through that tract to produce a well bottomed
on the adjacent lease. The court held that the drilling from the adjacent
lease could be enjoined or prevented by the lessee of the drill site tract.
Such drilling would not constitute tortious interference with the contractual
rights of the Plaintiff lessee. The court noted that that drilling of wells from
one lease to an adjacent lease is surface use for accommodation doctrine
purposes. The court further found that when land is leased for oil and gas
purposes, the surface owner owns and controls the earth underground his
surface and the mineral owner has the exclusive right to possess, use and
appropriate oil and gas. The mineral estate is the “dominant estate” in that
the lessee has the right to use the surface as is reasonably necessary to
remove and produce the leased mineral. A trespass includes the
unauthorized interference with the rights of the property holder as well as
unauthorized interference with the physical property. However, the court
noted that the right to drill, explore and produce the mineral does not
include the right to possess the specific space where the minerals are
located. A trespass as to minerals only occurs if there is an interference with
the ability of the lessee to exercise its right. The loss of minerals by such
drilling activity would be small and is outweighed by interests of the
181. 520 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. 2017).
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industry and society to maximize oil and gas recovery. The court found that
the surface owner’s action in allowing Anadarko to drill from the adjacent
tract did not constitute a tortious interference.
In Noble Energy, Inc. v. ConocoPhillips Co.,182 the court held that Noble
assumed certain liability, when its predecessor purchased a lease from
Alma Energy Corp., a debtor in bankruptcy. ConocoPhillips had assigned
Alma Energy a lease (the Lease), which assignment was governed by an
exchange agreement. Under the exchange agreement Alma Energy agreed
to indemnify ConocoPhillips for all claims arising out of waste materials or
hazardous substances arising under the Lease, among other properties. A
few years later, Alma Energy declared bankruptcy. Noble’s predecessor in
title acquired the Lease, which Alma Energy did not specifically reject
during the bankruptcy proceedings. Thereafter, ConocoPhillips settled a
$63 million claim related to the Lease. ConocoPhillips sought indemnity
from Noble pursuant to the exchange agreement, which it claimed Noble
had assumed. Noble contended that it never specifically assumed the
exchange agreement. Noble also argued that the boilerplate language in the
bankruptcy plan, which provided that “any Executory Contract or lease not
referenced above shall be assumed and assigned,” did not reflect Noble’s
intent to assume the exchange agreement. Nonetheless, the court found in
favor of ConocoPhillips, stating that the language in the plan was sufficient
to provide Noble’s predecessor with notice that the exchange contract was
assumed.
Crawford v. XTO Energy, Inc.183 centered on whether Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 39 required joinder of the lessor’s neighboring landowners
as parties to the suit. The plaintiff-lessor claimed an interest in a narrow
strip of land based on a 1964 mineral reservation. But XTO, the lessee’s
successor, apportioned all royalties on the strip to other adjacent
landowners under the common law strip-and-gore doctrine. The lessor sued
XTO for royalties without joining the abutting landowners. The trial court
dismissed the case because of the absence of the adjacent owners, reasoning
that they were necessary parties under Rule 39. The court held this was an
abuse of discretion. Rule 39 requires joinder of a party who claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in his absence may as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest. While XTO claimed these
surrounding landowners had such an interest under the common law strip182. 15-0502, 2017 WL 2719329 (Tex. June 23, 2017).
183. 509 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. 2017).
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and-gore doctrine, the surrounding landowners themselves made no such
claim. The court explained that Rule 39 does not require joinder of persons
who potentially could claim an interest in the subject of the action; it only
requires joinder of persons who actually claim such an interest.
Accordingly, the surrounding landowners were not necessary parties under
Rule 39.
In Jarzombek v. Ramsey,184 the court determined that the “discovery
rule” is not applicable in cases in which the terms of the deed differ from
the terms in the associated real estate contract. The Jarzombeks owned the
surface estate to two tracts of land. They owned 100% of the mineral
interest to one tract and a one-sixteenth royalty interest to the second tract.
In the real estate contract, Ramsey purchased the surface estate and one-half
of the mineral and royalty interest then owned by the Jarzombeks for both
tracts. The warranty deed conveyed both tracts to Ramsey, reserving an
undivided one-thirty-second royalty interest to the two tracts for twenty
years. Almost seven years later, the Jarzombeks sued for deed reformation,
alleging the suit was timely because the discovery rule tolled the statute of
limitations. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order of summary
judgment on this issue, holding that the deed unambiguously reserved only
a one-thirtysecond interest in both tracts. Because this fact was evident on
the face of the deed, the Jarzombeks had actual knowledge of what the deed
included as of the date the deed was signed. Therefore, the statute of
limitations began to run upon execution of the deed and the discovery rule
did not apply.
In FLST, Ltd. v. Explorer Pipeline Co.,185 the court declined to determine
for purposes of the “discovery rule” whether plaintiffs were reasonably
diligent in their investigation of certain property that they had purchased.
Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant for damages resulting from a
reduction in the subsequent sale price of plaintiffs’ property that was due to
defendant’s pipeline that ran underneath plaintiffs’ property. Defendant
argued that plaintiffs were on constructive notice of the pipeline before
purchasing the property and thus should not be afforded the benefit of the
discovery rule because, among other pieces of evidence, gas pipeline
markers were present and visible on the property when plaintiffs purchased
it. Although plaintiffs were aware of the gas pipeline markers, they
provided at least some evidence that contradicted the fact that a pipeline ran
184. 04-16-00571-CV, 2017 WL 2561556, pet. denied, (Tex. App.—San Antonio June
14, 2017).
185. No. 4:16-CV-00017-KPJ, 2017 WL 1956796 (E.D. Tex. 2017).
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beneath plaintiffs’ property. That is, the easement allowing the pipeline to
run beneath the property had been amended by a prior owner to purportedly
relocate the easement off the property. In fact, the pipeline was never
actually relocated. The court held that it could not, as a matter of law,
decide whether plaintiffs were reasonably diligent for purposes of the
discovery rule because defendant did not establish that plaintiffs’ could not
rely on the contradicting evidence.
In Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation v. Newfield Exploration Mid-Continent
Inc.,186 the court highlighted the potential pitfall of a vaguely worded
reservation. Cabot purported to reserve an interest in a mineral lease in an
assignment executed by Cabot. Newfield was the operator of the lease and
argued that the Texas statute of frauds voided the portion of the reservation
pertaining to “the 160 acre proration unit surrounding said well” due to an
inability to accurately identify the acreage. The court agreed and held that
such a description is insufficient because such language does not identify
with reasonable certainty the acres that are to be included in the reservation.
The court emphasized that a proration unit relating to the well had yet to be
designated, and no particular geographic proration unit was named in the
assignment or identified in any writing to which the assignment alluded.
The court went on to explain that merely identifying the property as some
specific quantum of acreage surrounding a well does not meet the demands
of the statute of frauds and thus held the reservation void. Cabot also raised
judicial and quasi estoppel arguments. In rejecting those arguments, the
court explained that no contractual right existed for Cabot to enforce by
barring Newfield from questioning its existence through estoppel. The court
reiterated the rule that estoppel cannot be used to create a contract or supply
essential terms of a contract.
In Texas Outfitters Ltd., LLC v. Nicholson,187 the court reaffirmed the
rule that an executive owner can breach its duty of good faith and fair
dealing by refusing to lease either arbitrarily or when “motivated by self
interest to the non-executive’s detriment.”188 After purchasing both surface
rights and executive mineral rights from the Carter family, Texas Outfitters
received two lease offers for the mineral rights. It declined both offers,
reasoning that it wanted to protect its surface level hunting business. The
186. 07-16-00125-CV, 2017 WL 2622773, no pet., (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 13,
2017).
187. 04-16-00392-CV, 2017 WL 2124494, pet. filed, (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 17,
2017).
188. Id. (quoting Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of State, 352 S.W.3d 479, 491 (Tex.
2011)).
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court determined that the record contained sufficient evidence to establish a
breach. First, the owner of Texas Outfitters stated that there would be no
lease despite purchasing the Carters’ executive rights with the purpose of
further developing the mineral estate. Second, Texas Outfitters proposed to
resell the surface and mineral rights to the Carters at an unfavorable price.
Third, Texas Outfitters proposed restrictive covenants that would
effectively preclude a mineral lease. Finally, the court rejected Texas
Outfitters’ contention that it was holding out for a better offer because none
of the surrounding landowners had received an offer better than that made
to Texas Outfitters.
In Mzyk v. Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co.–USA,189 the court explained
the limits of the “reasonably prudent operator” standard with respect to
offset well obligations. Under the lease, if a neighboring operator drilled a
well within 467 feet of the lease line, the lessee agreed to drill such offset
well or wells on the lease as a reasonably prudent operator would drill
under the same or similar circumstances. A number of wells were drilled
adjacent to the lessor’s property within 467 feet. The lessee decided that
drilling on the lease would not be profitable and that a reasonably prudent
operator would not have drilled the lease. The lessor sued for breach of the
offset-well provision, arguing the provision established how the lessee was
to drill an offset well, not whether to drill at all. Affirming summary
judgment for the lessee, the court explained that the lease provision
expressly adopted the “reasonably prudent operator” standard, which
generally applies to the lessee’s determination of whether to drill an offset
well at all, not just to how the lessee would drill an offset well, as the lessor
argued. Because the lessor offered no evidence that a reasonably prudent
operator would have drilled an offset well, the court affirmed summary
judgment for the lessee.
XII. West Virginia
A. Legislative Developments
The West Virginia Legislature passed the West Virginia Safer
Workplaces Act, H.B. 2857,190 which expands the circumstances under
which employers may conduct drug and alcohol testing. Previously,
employees could be tested under two circumstances: (1) if a reasonable
189. No. 04-15-00677-CV, 2017 WL 2797479, no pet., (Tex. App.—San Antonio June
28, 2017).
190. 2017 W.V. HB 2875.
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suspicion existed to justify the test; or (2) if the employee held a safety
sensitive position. Now, drug and/or alcohol testing may be performed for a
variety of reasons (e.g., deterrence of illicit drug use, investigating
accidents in the workplace or possible individual employee impairment).
Under the new law, testing may even occur where there are no indications
of individual, job-related impairment. Thus, the new law greatly expands an
employer’s ability to test employees.
The West Virginia Legislature passed H.B. 2811,191 which amends the
Abovegound Storage Tank Act (ASTA) by exempting tanks used to store
brine and other gas industry waste liquids. The bill exempts an estimated
2,300 tanks. The exemption only applies to tanks located inside the “zone
of peripheral concern,” which is an area between 5 and 10 hours upstream
of a drinking water intake. Tanks are exempted that have a capacity of 210
barrels, which is 8,850 gallons, and contain brine water or other fluids
produced in connection with hydrocarbon production activities. These tanks
will have to register with the West Virginia Department of Environmental
Protection but are not covered under other parts of the ASTA.
The West Virginia Legislature passed S.B. 505,192 which provides a fiveyear reclamation period following completion of well pads for horizontal
wells.
B. Judicial Developments
In Leggett v EQT Production Company193, the court found that the use of
the language “at the wellhead” in West Virginia’s Flat Rate Royalty Statute
allows the use of the "net back" method to calculate royalties. In doing so,
the court found that the Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources,
L.L.C. case did not apply or control. The court was tasked with determining
whether the holding in Tawney, which did not allow post-production
expense deductions when calculating royalty, applied when royalties are
paid on old, flat rate leases converted to a one-eighth royalty by application
of Flat Rate Royalty Statute. The statute provides that royalties are to be
paid “at the wellhead.” Tawney held that “at the wellhead” language in a
lease was ambiguous, and deductions could not be taken unless expressly
authorized in the lease in detail as to the type and method of calculation. In
Leggett, the court held that the rules of contract construction used to decide
Tawney did not apply when interpreting a statute. The ruling in this case
191. 2017 W.V. HB 2811.
192. 2017 W.V. SB 505.
193. 800 S.E.2d 850 (W. Va. 2017).
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indicated the court’s potential willingness to reconsider Tawney, which
would impact royalty calculations for West Virginia production.
In Bowyer v. Wyckoff,194 the court held that a party seeking a partition of
property by allotment or by sale under W. Va. Code § 37-4-3 must strictly
follow the prerequisites in the statute. In Bowyer, a party was seeking to
partition the surface of property in kind or by sale. A counterclaim was
brought, however, seeking to partition both the surface and the mineral
interests either though by allotment or by sale, allegedly because the party
wanted to develop the shallow natural gas under the property. The court
rejected partition by sale of the surface and mineral interests because the
challenging party had not otherwise proven entitlement to partition by sale
under §37-4-3. The Court maintained the following rationale for rejecting
sale by partition:
The forced sale of oil and gas minerals precludes the owner of
the benefit of lease consideration and the prospect of production
proceeds, which represent the primary and perhaps the exclusive
value which such ownership vests. Therefore, the public interest
will not be promoted by sale.
Under this rationale, any partition for sale or by allotment under §37-4-3
can be forestalled by a single interest holder who does not wish to sell his
or her interest—which undercuts the entire purpose of the partition statute
and results in a “forced” sale of a person’s property interest, whether the
partition be by sale or by allotment. The Court’s implicit acceptance of the
notion that any “forced sale of oil and gas interests” precludes partition is
likely to hamper efforts of oil and natural gas producers to use the partition
statute to develop minerals.
C. Administrative Developments
The WVDEP issued a Final Interpretive Rule, 33 CSR 1A, "Disposal of
Completion or Production Waste." One amendment involved modifying the
proposed term "Completion Waste" to instead be termed as "Completion
and Production Waste." The change of the term to include the words
"Production Waste" supports landfills in accepting production waste
streams in addition to the completion waste streams. Further, Section 3.1
was amended to clarify that the permittee should obtain a minor permit
modification prior to accepting or disposing of completion waste in the
landfill. WDVEP has changed the language in subsection 3.3 to clarify the
194. 796 S.E.2d 233 (W. Va. 2017).
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radiation monitoring requirements that apply are from subsection 3.5 of the
proposed rule. Subdivisions 3.4.a and 3.4.b were combined to clarify the
waste profiling requirements needed to obtain a minor permit modification.
Subdivision 3.4.c was amended to ensure that if the combined concentration
in the waste was equal to fifty picocuries per gram (50pCi/gr.), the facility
could also accept the waste for disposal.
XIII. Wyoming
A. Legislative Developments
The legislature addressed two issues related to Wyoming’s ad
valorem/gross products tax on oil and gas and other mineral production.
First, the legislature required the Wyoming Department of Revenue to
conduct a study on a potential discounted cash flow valuation method for
ad valorem production taxes.195 Second, the legislature clarified that when a
producer properly withholds royalties to pay taxes, fees, or penalties on
behalf of a royalty or overriding royalty owner, ad valorem tax liens will
not attach to the property of the royalty or overriding royalty owner.196
The legislature authorized the Governor to use Wyoming’s Federal
Natural Resource Policy Account to facilitate mineral development
permitting and to address related issues.197
Finally, the legislature extended the sunset or expiration date of
Wyoming’s sales and use tax exemption on sales or leases of machinery
used in the state for manufacturing (including certain oil refining
operations) from December 31, 2017 to December 31, 2027.198
B. Judicial Developments
In Questar Exploration & Production v. Rocky Mountain Resources,199
the Wyoming Supreme Court distinguished an earlier opinion, Ultra
Resources v. Hartman,200 and determined an oil and gas lease did not
constitute a renewal, substitute, or new lease, when compared to earlier
195. H. Enrolled Act 85, ch. 143 2017 Leg., 64th Gen, Sess. (Wyo. 2017).
196. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-13-108(d)(vi)(B) and (O); H. Enrolled Act 74, 2017 Leg.,
64th Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2017).
197. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-4-218(c); S. Enrolled Act 53, 2017 Leg., 64th Gen. Sess.
(Wyo. 2017).
198. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-15-105(a)(viii)(O); 39-16-105(a)(viii)(D); S. Enrolled Act
80, 2017 Leg., 64th Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2017).
199. 388 P.3d 523 (Wyo. 2017).
200. 226 P.3d 889 (Wyo. 2010).
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leases for similar areas. As such, royalty interests established in the older
leases did not transfer to the newer lease.201
Anadarko Land Corp. v. Family Tree Corp.202 involved complicated and
competing chains of title to oil and gas interests. One chain of title
originated from disputed production taxes assessed by a Wyoming county
in 1911. While the court determined the production taxes were improperly
assessed, it concluded the county’s action was not a clear jurisdictional
error. The resulting tax sale and deed were merely voidable and because the
assessments were not challenged within the statutory limitations period, the
court concluded deeds based on the assessment and tax sale were valid.
In Wyoming v. Zinke,203 the court set aside the Bureau of Land
Management’s (BLM) March 2015 hydraulic fracturing regulation.204
Supporters of the regulation appealed the court’s decision to the Tenth
Circuit. However, before the appeal was decided, the BLM asked the Tenth
Circuit to hold the case in abeyance based on Executive Orders issued by
the President.205 On September 21, 2017, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the
appeals as prudentially unripe.206
Bear Peak Resources, LLC v. Peak Powder River Resources, LLC,207
concerned a mineral acquisition and development agreement between two
parties. The agreement applied to a specific Area of Mutual Interest (AMI).
When one of the parties acquired mineral interests without compensating
the other party, that second party sued for breach of contract, breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, accounting, breach of
fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment. A state
district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant and
dismissed the lawsuit. On appeal, the court affirmed the summary judgment
order on the breach of implied covenant, accounting and breach of fiduciary
duty claims. However, the court reversed the district court’s decision on the
interpretation and status of the AMI agreement, and remanded to the district
court with instructions to reconsider those issues.

201. Questar Expl. & Prod., 388 P.3d at 532.
202. 389 P.3d 1218 (Wyo. 2017).
203. 871 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2017).
204. Id. at 1139 (citing Wyoming v. United States, Nos. 2:15-CV-041-SWS, 2:15-CV043-SWS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82132, 2016 WL 3509415, at *3-*10 (D. Wyo. June 21,
2016)).
205. 871 F.3d at 1140.
206. Id. at 1146.
207. 403 P.3d 1033 (Wyo. 2017).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

260

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 4

C. Administrative Developments
In early 2017, the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
revised its rules to set specific limits for natural gas flaring and venting. 208
The new rules allow emergency flaring and venting, and recognize flaring
and venting may occur during well purging, evaluation, or production
tests.209

208. 055-0001-3 WYO. CODE R. § 39(b)(iv) (LexisNexis 2017).
209. Id. at § 39(b)(i)-(iii).
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